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a b s t r a c t 
With the rapid development and popularization of mobile and wireless communication 
technologies, ridesourcing companies have been able to leverage internet-based platforms 
to operate e-hailing services in many cities around the world. These companies connect 
passengers and drivers in real time and are disruptively changing the transportation indus- 
try. As pioneers in a general sharing economy context, ridesourcing shared transportation 
platforms consist of a typical two-sided market. On the demand side, passengers are sensi- 
tive to the price and quality of the service. On the supply side, drivers, as freelancers, make 
working decisions ﬂexibly based on their income from the platform and many other fac- 
tors. Diverse variables and factors in the system are strongly endogenous and interactively 
dependent. How to design and operate ridesourcing systems is vital—and challenging—for 
all stakeholders: passengers/users, drivers/service providers, platforms, policy makers, and 
the general public. In this paper, we propose a general framework to describe ridesourcing 
systems. This framework can aid understanding of the interactions between endogenous 
and exogenous variables, their changes in response to platforms’ operational strategies and 
decisions, multiple system objectives, and market equilibria in a dynamic manner. Under 
the proposed general framework, we summarize important research problems and the cor- 
responding methodologies that have been and are being developed and implemented to 
address these problems. We conduct a comprehensive review of the literature on these 
problems in different areas from diverse perspectives, including (1) demand and pricing, 
(2) supply and incentives, (3) platform operations, and (4) competition, impacts, and reg- 
ulations. The proposed framework and the review also suggest many avenues requiring 
future research. 
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid development and popularization of mobile and wireless communication technologies, ridesourcing com- 
panies have been able to leverage internet-based platforms to operate e-hailing services in many cities around the world. 
These companies—including Uber, Lyft, Didi, Grab, Careem, and Ola—connect passengers and drivers in real time and are 
disruptively changing the transportation industry, and especially the conventional taxi industry. The sharing economy, as 
deﬁned by Hu (2019) , refers to an online platform that enables individuals or small entities as buyers and sellers to interact 
effectively and eﬃciently or a market model that allows the sharing of access to goods and services. Although the exact 
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deﬁnition of the sharing economy is still a matter of debate (e.g., Belk, 2014; Frenken, 2017 ; and Frenken and Schor, 2017 ), 
these shared transportation companies, as providers of on-demand transportation services on online platforms, are often 
viewed as pioneers in a general sharing economy. 
The recent penetration of mobile internet technologies in our daily lives has enabled the rapid expansion of these rides- 
ourcing services. Uber, for instance, has grown from a ridesourcing service provider to a one-stop mobile transportation 
platform, offering a variety of services in more than 700 metropolitan areas in 65 countries. It offers a menu of services, in- 
cluding UberX (the least expensive service), Uber Black (executive luxury service), Uber Pool (ridesplitting service), Taxi (taxi 
service on platform), SUV (luxury service with extra seats), etc., to more than 91 million users with 15 million daily trips 
as of mid-2019, according to data collected by a third-party (see DMR, 2019a ). Didi, the largest shared mobility platform 
in China, offers services including Taxi (taxi service on platform), Express (the least expensive service), Premier (mid-price 
upgraded service), Luxe (executive luxury service), Pool (ridesplitting service), Hitch (ridesharing service), Minibus (minibus 
shared-ride service), Designated Driving (designated driver for passenger’s own vehicle), Bike-sharing (bicycle-sharing ser- 
vice), etc., to more than 550 million users in 400 cities in China, with 30 million daily trips as of mid-2019 (see DMR, 2019b ). 
These companies are emerging as a disruptive force for the conventional transportation industry. They are also deploying 
electric vehicles and developing self-driving technologies to address the transportation needs of citizens in a sustainable 
urban ecology. 
Ridesourcing companies provide a platform for and/or intermediary means of connecting demand (i.e., passengers) and 
supply (i.e., drivers) (see, for example, Shaheen et al., 2017 , Mobility on Demand Operational Concept Report). Passengers 
enter their travel request details on an e-hailing mobile app, including trip origin, destination, departure time, and service 
type; idle drivers aﬃliated with the platform may cruise around the city or wait at speciﬁc locations. The online platform 
then enables a convenient match between passengers and drivers using matching and order dispatching algorithms. The 
platform charges a fare to passengers and pays a wage and/or bonus to drivers. The difference between the fare and the 
wage is the commission withheld by the platform, which is normally between 15% and 30%, depending on the time, region, 
and company. After each trip, passengers can rate the drivers who provided the transportation service, which helps to 
quantify the quality of service provided by the aﬃliated drivers. 
The ridesourcing platforms consist of a typical two-sided market, which is a meeting place for two groups of agents 
(passengers and drivers, in this case) who interact and provide each other with network beneﬁts. Rochet and Tirole (2003, 
2006 ) demonstrate the commonality across seemingly different businesses and markets with a clear characterization of the 
two-sided market. A two-sided market provides a platform that enables interactions between end-users and works to align 
the two sides by charging each side appropriately. Mathematically, consider a platform charging a b and a s per-interaction to 
the buyer and seller sides. The market for interactions between the two sides is one-sided if the volume V of transactions 
realized on the platform depends only on the aggregate price level a = a b + a s , i.e., is insensitive to reallocations of the total 
price a between the buyer and the seller. If by contrast V varies with a b and a s while a is kept constant, the market is said 
to be two-sided. Speciﬁcally, in the context of ridesourcing, passengers and drivers are sensitive to the prices and wages of 
the service, which are the critical decisions the platform makes to coordinate and balance demand and supply. The volume 
of transactions (i.e., the number of served orders) depends on both the price charged to the passengers (i.e., a b ) and the 
wage paid to the drivers (i.e., − a s ) when a b + a s is a constant. These features motivate various operational strategies, such 
as “dynamic or surge pricing/wage,” by which the platform adjusts both the prices and wages dynamically depending on 
real-time supply and demand information, taking both platform performance (such as revenue, number of served orders, 
market share, and proﬁt) and social welfare (including passenger utility and driver income) into consideration. 
In conventional taxi businesses, drivers, who are often employees of taxi companies, are usually required to obtain an 
occupational license, or “medallion,” to provide transportation services to passengers. In practice, there is great variety in 
taxi regulations, which vary widely between countries or even regions or cities. In some cases, the regions in which drivers 
can pick up passengers are restricted to the jurisdiction that issued the medallion, and fares are often set by regulatory 
bodies. In some places, taxi drivers are required to work full-time, and in others, taxi drivers may schedule their work 
ﬂexibly as private business owners. 
By comparison with conventional taxi businesses, ridesourcing systems provide private car owners with opportunities 
for more ﬂexible working, providing an additional source of service providers to satisfy on-demand travel requests. In rides- 
ourcing systems, drivers, often freelancers, can use their own or leased cars to offer transportation services whenever and 
wherever they choose, subject to fewer regulations than taxi drivers. They design their working schedules more ﬂexibly and 
decide whether, when and how long to work on the platform on a day-to-day basis in response to many factors, such as 
wage and income ﬂuctuations. Another key difference is that drivers in ridesourcing systems cannot be hailed in the street, 
in contrast to conventional taxi drivers for whom hailing is the main source of passengers. The emergence of ridesourcing 
systems and the ways in which they differ from conventional taxi systems raises controversial issues and regulatory prob- 
lems, such as unclear regulation of labor relations between platforms and drivers, the debatable effects of surge pricing, 
“gray” tax enforcement on driver income, inconsistency between platform interests and social welfare, and other societal 
and environmental impacts. 
Designing and operating ridesourcing systems is vital—and challenging—for all stakeholders: passengers/users, 
drivers/service providers, platforms, policy makers, and the general public. In this paper, we propose a general framework 
to describe ridesourcing systems. The framework can aid understanding of interactions between endogenous and exoge- 
nous variables, their changes in response to platforms’ operational strategies and decisions, multiple system objectives, and 
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market equilibria in a dynamic manner. We summarize important research problems concerning ridesourcing systems and 
the corresponding methodologies that have been and are being developed and implemented to address these problems. We 
conduct a comprehensive review of the literature about these problems in different areas from diverse perspectives, includ- 
ing (1) demand and pricing, (2) supply and incentives, (3) platform operations, and (4) competition, impacts and regulations. 
We also discuss directions for future research. 
There are several different but similar terminologies in shared transportation services, such as ridesourcing, ridehailing, 
ridesharing, ridesplitting, and transportation network companies (TNC). In this paper, we focus on ridesourcing systems (i.e., 
a ﬂeet of freelance drivers providing on-demand transportation service using their own or leased vehicles in ﬂexible self- 
determined working shifts) that are conducted through e-hailing (i.e., the operation of shared transportation services to 
connect passengers and drivers using mobile devices with internet-based real-time information). Ridesourcing systems are 
also often called ridehailing systems or TNC, where the former term emphasizes the fact that drivers use their own or leased 
vehicles slightly. As for the term ridesplitting, it refers to a ridesourcing service in which passengers can opt to split both 
a ride and the fare (i.e., like dynamic carpooling). The service allows dynamic matching and route variation in real time to 
combine passenger requests with close itineraries in multi-rider trips. The price for a ridesplitting service is normally lower 
than that of regular ridesourcing services. Another term, ridesharing, refers to a service that connects drivers and passengers 
who share similar origins, destinations, and departure times. Drivers in a ridesharing system have their own travel needs 
which they modify to accommodate one or more passengers to conserve resources and save money. Unlike ridesharing, 
ridesourcing drivers operate for proﬁt and typically provide rides not incidental to their own trips. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 , we present a general framework to describe ridesourcing systems 
and summarize important research problems and relevant methodologies. In Section 3 , we conduct a review of research 
problems and studies of the demand and pricing of ridesourcing systems. In Section 4 , we review the research and literature 
on supply and incentives. In Section 5 , we review the research and literature on various platform operational strategies. 
In Section 6 , we review the research and literature on platform competition, their impacts, and government regulations. 
Relevant future research directions are also discussed in Sections 3 –6 . Finally, in Section 7 , we provide concluding remarks. 
2. A general framework 
2.1. Framework 
A general framework for ridesourcing systems is depicted in Fig. 1 , which illustrates the intrinsic relations between 
variables and factors for the relevant stakeholders, agents and attributes. 
Fig. 1. General framework for ridesourcing systems. 
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The objectives of ridesourcing systems exist in multiple dimensions and may change according to the speciﬁc devel- 
opmental stage, market conditions, platform competition, and government regulations. Some common objectives include 
balancing passenger demand and driver (vehicle) supply over time and space, maximizing long-term and/or short-term 
platform revenue and proﬁt, maximizing long-term and/or short-term market share and penetration, and maximizing so- 
cial welfare. To operate the transportation service and achieve these objectives, platforms must employ various operational 
strategies and make decisions from diverse perspectives. Speciﬁcally, some of the critical strategies used and decisions made 
by platform operators include static, dynamic or surge pricing and promotions for passengers; static, dynamic or surge wages 
and incentives for drivers; order dispatching and matching between drivers and passengers; ridesplitting operations related 
to assignment and fare splitting; guidance and repositioning of empty vehicles (i.e., idle drivers awaiting new passengers); 
information sharing and disclosure; rating mechanism, etc. 
Passenger demand and driver supply are the two major components of the ridesourcing market. On the demand side, 
depending on passengers’ attributes and behavior (e.g., value of time, willingness to pay) with temporal and spatial char- 
acteristics, potential passengers evaluate ridesourcing services by the service quality (e.g., waiting time until pick-up) and 
fare charged by the platform, and weigh these against alternative travel modes, such as conventional taxis and other public 
transportation services to make their travel decisions. On the supply side, depending on drivers’ attributes, qualiﬁcations, 
and behavior (e.g., vehicle operation and fuel as the cost of working on the platform, reservation wage as an opportunity 
cost to work), potential drivers make working decisions regarding whether to work on the platform—and if so, when and 
how long to work—in response to many variables and factors particular to each platform; these are compared with other 
job options, including income level, working environment, job security, comfort level, pressure of work, exposure to risk, 
etc. The income level is a critical factor, which depends on the hourly wage, working cost, incentives and bonuses, as well 
as the fraction of idle time for drivers. In order to capture the temporal and spatial characteristics of the market, the plat- 
forms usually divide an entire region served (e.g., a city) into small cells using a grid (e.g., a hexagonal lattice is used in 
Didi’s modeling platform in China) and discretize time into short intervals (e.g., 15 min per interval), and then make general 
predictions on the demand and supply for each gird cell and time interval for their operational strategies. 
In ridesourcing systems, the interface between passengers and drivers is still rife with meeting friction caused by many 
spatial and temporal factors (e.g., Yang et al., 2002 ). Although this friction is much effectively reduced by comparison with 
conventional taxi services, it cannot be eliminated completely. As shown in Fig. 1 , the ridesourcing market has two impor- 
tant characteristics: trip service quality (e.g., passenger’s waiting time, ridesplitting detours) and driver income level (which 
is affected, for example, by the driver idle time on the platform, working costs, incentives and bonuses). On one hand, the 
equilibrium demand is realized at a certain level of average passenger waiting time, which is generally considered to be 
an important measure of the service quality. Higher passenger demand and lower driver supply usually decrease the ser- 
vice quality (e.g., by increasing passenger waiting time), while decreased trip service quality will in turn reduce passenger 
demand. On the other hand, the equilibrium quantity of services supplied is greater than the actual quantity of services 
consumed with a certain amount of slack (e.g., average vacant vehicle-hours like the taxi idle time of Arnott, 1996 ), which 
is an important factor that affects the actual income received by drivers. Higher passenger demand and lower driver supply 
usually increase drivers’ income level (e.g., by reducing driver idle time), while an increased driver income level in turn 
attracts more drivers. Therefore, trip service quality, driver income level, passenger demand, and driver supply are strongly 
endogenous and interactively dependent, while the endogenous inﬂuences and interactions are highly dynamic. These vari- 
ables are thus crucial factors inﬂuencing operational strategies and decisions (e.g., pricing and promotions for passengers, 
wage and incentives for drivers, matching and order dispatching, ridesplitting assignment and fare splitting, guidance and 
repositioning of empty vehicles, information sharing, and ratings) and the resulting eﬃciency of the ridesourcing market. 
2.2. Summary of research problems and methodologies 
As described in Section 2.1 , ridesourcing systems are complex, with many endogenous variables and interactive decisions. 
The design and operation of ridesourcing systems is challenging, encompassing numerous research problems from diverse 
perspectives. 
On the demand side, important research problems include (1) spatio-temporal demand estimation for ridesourcing sys- 
tems, (2) passenger mode choice with other travel alternatives, (3) mechanisms and algorithms for static and dynamic pric- 
ing, and (4) other passenger promotions. 
On the supply side, important research problems include (1) driver supply models to describe short- and long-term 
platform service capacity, (2) driver supply elasticity with respect to wage and incentives, (3) other driver behavior, and (4) 
mechanisms and algorithms for static and dynamic wages and incentives. 
To operate platform services better and improve system performance and eﬃciency, research problems for operators 
include (1) estimated time of arrival (ETA) for both pick-up and ride trips; eﬃcient operational strategies and algorithms for 
(2) order dispatching and matching between passengers and drivers, (3) ridesplitting operations related to assignment and 
fare splitting, and (4) guidance and repositioning of empty vehicles awaiting new passengers; and (5) information sharing 
and disclosure and (6) rating mechanism. 
Considering ridesourcing services as a part of a larger urban transportation system, research problems arise from (1) 
platform competition, (2) impacts on other transportation services, (3) societal and environmental impacts, and (4) relevant 
governmental regulations and policies. 
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To address these research problems, many models and algorithms using advanced methodologies, both classic and novel, 
have been and are being developed and implemented. These methodologies include statistics and econometrics, labor eco- 
nomics, microeconomics, queueing theory and stochastic process, integer and combinatorial optimization, stochastic and 
dynamic programming, game theory and mechanism design, and machine learning techniques (especially deep learning and 
reinforcement learning). We summarize the research problems and methodologies in Table 1 . The ﬁrst two columns list 
the areas and subareas of research problems; the ﬁrst row lists methodology ﬁelds. A ticked cell in the table indicates that 
the corresponding methodology has been and is being developed and implemented to address the corresponding research 
problem. Note that the methodology terms listed are not necessarily mutually exclusive; some terms have vague boundaries 
and overlap. We use these terms for ease in creating a general classiﬁcation and summary. 
3. Demand and pricing 
Understanding the patterns of demand and designing corresponding pricing schemes are prevalent research topics in 
many industries, including ridesourcing systems. Several studies examine the general factors that affect ridesourcing pas- 
senger demand. For example, Dias et al. (2017) show that users of ridesourcing platforms tend to be young, well-educated, 
higher-income working individuals who reside in higher-density areas. Gilibert et al. (2017) ﬁnd a greater intended use of 
ridesourcing services in a young population (age 18–29) using survey data from Barcelona. Alemi et al. (2018) ﬁnd a greater 
likelihood of using on-demand ride services by (i) highly educated, older millennials, (ii) travelers with a greater number 
of long-distance business trips and a higher share of long-distance trips made by air, (iii) frequent users of transportation- 
related smartphone apps, and (iv) users with stronger pro-environmental, technology-embracing, and variety-seeking atti- 
tudes, as well as (v) in areas with greater land-use mix and regional accessibility by car. Zhen (2019) ﬁnds that (i) social and 
recreational trips are the predominant type of ridesourcing trips followed by work trips, and (ii) trip lengths are shorter and 
vehicle occupancy rates are greater than typical trip makers. These studies give us a general picture of passenger demand 
for ridesourcing markets. In this section, we review research into demand and pricing for ridesourcing systems in four areas: 
spatio-temporal demand estimation in Section 3.1 , passenger mode choice in Section 3.2 , pricing schemes in Section 3.3 , and 
other passenger promotions in Section 3.4 . 
3.1. Spatio-temporal demand estimation 
Spatio-temporal demand estimation is important for all transportation systems, and a large body of literature has 
emerged over the last few decades. An accurate description and prediction of demand is critical in the design and oper- 
ational strategies of ridesourcing systems, including system capacity plans, ﬂeet recruitment and management, pricing and 
incentives design, etc. 
Long before the arrival of smartphone ridesourcing systems, many researchers proposed various methods for origin- 
destination (OD) ﬂow estimation in terms of vehicle traﬃc in the context of different transportation systems. For example, 
four methods based on a systems dynamics approach ( Cremer and Keller, 1987 ); OD estimation with geometric distributed 
travel time ( Bell, 1991 ); two state-space models with state-vector ( Ashok and Ben-Akiva, 20 0 0 ); a parametric optimiza- 
tion approach with a least squares model and column generation ( Sherali and Park, 2001 ); equilibrium-based estimation 
with congestion effects ( Yang et al., 1992, 2001 ); and a relaxation strategy with variational inequality and column gen- 
eration ( Nie and Zhang, 2008 ). Recent work includes quasi-dynamic estimation ( Cascetta et al., 2013 ); linear assignment 
matrix approximation ( Toledo and Kolechkina, 2013 ); extended quasi-dynamic estimation ( Bauer et al., 2018 ); simultane- 
ous perturbation stochastic approximation ( Tympakianaki et al., 2018 ); propagation algorithm on a layered computational 
graph ( Wu et al., 2018 ); and simulation-based optimization ( Osorio, 2019 ). Such vehicle ﬂow OD estimation can provide 
information to estimate passenger-level ridesourcing request OD demand, but it cannot be applied to ridesourcing demand 
estimation directly. Recent work has studied direct passenger demand estimation, mainly in the context of the taxi indus- 
try. For example, Moreira-Matias et al. (2016) propose an incremental framework to maintain statistics on urban mobility 
dynamics over a time-evolving OD matrix using high-speed GPS data streams, which the authors tested in a taxi network in 
Portugal. Held et al. (2018) provide a model order reduction approach to cluster mobility demand according to characteristic 
population groups that share similar travel behavior. Using Swiss household travel survey data and machine learning algo- 
rithms, they can extrapolate future mobility demand based on sociodemographic information. Other relevant work includes 
Moreira-Matias et al. (2012, 2013 ), Zhao et al. (2016), Zhang et al. (2017a) , etc. 
Identifying the spatio-temporal demand pattern is critical for the design and operation of ridesourcing systems. Space- 
dependent patterns provide information on hot and cold areas, and time-dependent patterns of peak and off-peak hours. 
Recent studies have examined the prediction of spatio-temporal demand for ridesourcing services using machine learn- 
ing techniques, given macro-level data such as land use and urban conﬁguration, in addition to micro-level data such as 
passenger demographic information and real-time weather and traﬃc conditions. For example, Saadi et al. (2017) pro- 
pose a spatio-temporal estimation of short-term demand that is a function of variables related to traﬃc, pricing, and 
weather conditions for a ridesourcing system. They adapt and compare several machine learning methods, including a sin- 
gle decision tree, bootstrap-aggregated decision trees, random forest, boosted decision trees, and artiﬁcial neural network. 
Ke et al. (2017) propose a deep learning approach—the fusion convolutional long short-term memory network (FCL-Net)—to 
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Table 1 
Research problems and methodologies for ridesourcing systems. 
Methodology 
Research problem Statistics and 
econometrics 
Labor 
economics 
Micro- 
economics 
Queueing 
theory and 
stochastic 
process 
Integer and 
combinatorial 
optimization 
Stochastic and 
dynamic 
programming 
Game theory 
and mechanism 
design 
Machine 
learning 
Demand and pricing 
Spatio-temporal demand estimation 
√ √ 
Passenger mode choice 
√ √ √ √ 
Pricing 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Passenger promotions 
√ √ 
Supply and incentives 
Driver supply model 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Supply elasticity 
√ √ √ 
Driver behavior 
√ √ √ √ 
Wage and incentives 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Platform operations 
Estimated time of arrival (ETA) 
√ √ 
Matching and order dispatching 
√ √ √ √ 
Ridesplitting operations 
√ √ √ √ 
Empty vehicle guidance and repositioning 
√ √ √ √ √ 
Information sharing and disclosure 
√ √ √ √ 
Rating mechanism 
√ √ √ √ 
Competition, impacts & 
regulations 
Competition 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Impacts on other transportation services 
√ √ 
Societal and environmental impacts 
√ 
Regulations 
√ √ √ 
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forecast short-term demand. The model is stacked and fused by multiple convolutional long short-term memory (LSTM) lay- 
ers, standard LSTM layers, and convolutional layers. The fusion of convolutional techniques and the LSTM network enables 
the proposed deep learning approach to capture the spatio-temporal characteristics and correlations of explanatory variables 
better. Yao et al. (2018) propose a deep multi-view spatio-temporal network (DMVST-Net) framework to model both spatial 
and temporal demand relations. The model consists of three views: a temporal view of modeling correlations between future 
demand values and near time points using LSTM, a spatial view of modeling local spatial correlation using local CNN, and 
a semantic view modeling correlations between regions sharing similar temporal patterns. In addition, combining estimates 
of both demand and supply, Wang et al. (2017a) present an end-to-end framework called deep supply-demand (DeepSD) 
using a deep neural network structure to predict the gap between supply and demand in a particular area over the next 
few minutes. Ke et al. (2018) partition a city into regular hexagonal lattices and propose a hexagon-based convolutional 
neural network (H-CNN) to predict the short-term supply-demand gap in ridesourcing services. 
As a future direction, we expect more advanced methods to combine emerging machine learning techniques with struc- 
tural models of ridesourcing systems for the spatio-temporal demand estimation. The different characteristics between 
short-term demand and long-term demand must be well studied for different purposes, such as short-term spatio-temporal 
pricing/promotions and long-term pricing strategies. Demand with uncertainty and extreme events also attracts great atten- 
tion from industry players (e.g., uncertainty estimation in Zhu and Laptev, 2017 ), which is another future research topic. 
3.2. Passenger mode choice 
Ridesourcing platforms normally provide a set of service options differentiated by price and quality. As described previ- 
ously, Uber provides service options such as Express, Black, Carpool, SUV, and Taxi; Didi provides service options such as 
Express, Premier, Luxe, Carpool, Hitch, Minibus, and Taxi. Therefore, passengers must not only decide whether to use the 
ridesourcing platforms rather than conventional transportation modes, but also choose a speciﬁc service option. The choice 
may depend on the characteristics of the service options (e.g., price, waiting time, travel time, vehicle type), of the pas- 
senger (e.g., number of people requesting a trip, budget, price elasticity, value of time, other preferences), and some other 
conditions (e.g., weather, congestion). 
The travel mode choice problem has been studied for a long time and is used to estimate the ridership share for existing 
and/or proposed transportation services. Inﬂuential work on general models of travel mode choice include Ben-Akiva et al. 
(1985), Bhat (1995), Swait (2001), Wen and Koppelman (2001), Bhat (2003) , and Train (2009) . Extensive work has also been 
conducted on travel mode choice in diverse speciﬁc contexts, such as built environments ( Cervero, 2002 ); travel mode with 
a theory of planned behavior ( Bamberg et al., 2003 ); children’s travel modes to school ( McMillan, 2007 ); urban forms of 
mode choice ( Kockelman, 1997; Schwanen and Mokhtarian, 2005; Frank et al., 2008 ); the choice between a taxi and a bike 
( Faghih-Imani et al., 2017 ); and the importance of social dependency effects on shared mobility service usage ( Vinayak et al., 
2018 ). 
The choice between a ridesourcing platform and conventional modes—e.g., taxi, bus, and metro—has been studied re- 
cently. For example, Agarwal et al. (2019) investigate whether passengers switching between taxis and ridesourcing are 
inﬂuenced by relative prices using the market in Singapore. They ﬁnd that a 10% increase in the ridesourcing surge factor 
raises taxi bookings by 4% in the same area of origin and half-hour interval. This substitution between ridesourcing services 
and taxi bookings in response to the surge factor comprises around 10% of taxi booking revenues. Other work includes the 
factors that inﬂuence passengers’ choice to use Uber or a taxi service in Taiwan ( Hwang et al., 2018 ), and the choice be- 
tween, and comparison of, Uber and taxi services in US cities such as New York (NYC) and Chicago ( Salnikov et al., 2015; 
Wallsten, 2015 ). 
The choice between diverse service options on ridesourcing platforms has also attracted much attention recently, espe- 
cially the choice between a solo ride and a shared ride (i.e., ridesplitting service such as Uber Pool, Lyft Line, Didi Pool, 
and Grab Share). For example, Lavieri and Bhat (2019) study two essential elements in the adoption of ridesplitting shared 
rides: the individual’s acceptance of the increased travel time associated with other passengers’ pick-up/drop-off and the 
individual’s approval to share a vehicle with strangers. Using a multivariate integrated choice and latent variable approach, 
they examine current choices and future intentions regarding the use of shared rides and estimate individuals’ willingness 
to share, as well as the value of travel time, for distinct trip purposes. Sarriera et al. (2017) focus on the social and be- 
havioral considerations of shared rides using survey of ridesourcing users through Mechanical Turk and identify the role of 
social interactions in passenger mode choice. Stocker and Shaheen (2018) review possible future shared automated vehicle 
business models and their potential impacts on shared mobility services and user behavior. They point out that shared rides 
could become more common if automation renders deviation more eﬃcient, more cost effective, and less onerous to users. 
Chen et al. (2017c) present an ensemble learning approach to understand the ridesplitting behavior of passengers better, 
and employ a boosting ensemble by growing individual decision trees sequentially, then assembling the trees to produce 
a powerful classiﬁcation model to predict whether an individual will share a ride. They rank and select a variety of fea- 
tures using the ReliefF algorithm, such as trip travel time, trip costs, trip length, waiting time fee, travel time reliability of 
origins/destinations, and so on. 
The behavior and impact of passenger choice between diverse service options on a platform is an important area for 
future research. As demonstrated by Ke et al. (2019) , a key concern is that passenger choice will in turn affect the util- 
ity of each service option. For example, if more passengers choose ridesplitting and the platform has a high density of 
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ridesplitting passengers, the actual detour pick-up time and travel distance for the ridesplitting service will decrease, which 
will in turn increase the utility of the ridesplitting option. Such endogeneity between the decision maker’s choice and the 
service option’s utility must be considered carefully. For the platform operator, considering substitutions between diverse 
service options, providing good service segmentation, and managing a limited ﬂeet to provide multiple substituted service 
options are important issues. Another area that is important but has not been well examined is passenger behavior in the 
ridesourcing market. Examples of such behavior include passenger cancellation because of a long wait before being assigned 
to a vehicle (e.g., Wang et al., 2019 ), passenger cancellation because of a long pick-up time after being assigned a vehi- 
cle, passenger reorder and rebooking after cancellation, passenger attitude towards and choice of a bundled service option 
(e.g., a passenger may be neutral regarding services by taxi or private car, or neutral regarding ridesplitting or non-splitting 
services. The platforms provide a bundled service option and assign the passengers opting for a bundle option to either 
service), and passenger perceptions of and reaction to driver ratings. 
3.3. Pricing 
Ridesourcing platforms consist of a typical two-sided market. In the most inﬂuential work on two-sided markets, 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider a general model of competition between two platforms with the transaction volume 
in a multiplicative function of demand and supply. Other inﬂuential work on the economics of two-sided markets include 
Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (20 06), Rysman (20 09) , and Weyl (2010) . In a two-sided market, price affects both 
demand (i.e., passengers in the ridesourcing market) and supply (i.e., drivers in the ridesourcing market). Speciﬁcally, if 
we call the fare charged to passengers the price, the remuneration paid to drivers the wage, and the difference between 
price and wage withheld by the platform the commission, the necessity of determining the price, wage, and commission for 
ridesourcing platforms is central to their operation. Therefore, in this subsection, we refer to the interactive and integrated 
optimization of price, wage and commission as pricing problems. 
Pricing in the two-sided market, especially in the context of a ridesourcing two-sided market, has attracted considerable 
attention recently. Many researchers focus on the interactions and endogeneity between various factors involved in pricing. 
For example, Bai et al. (2018) propose a queueing model that considers earnings-sensitive independent drivers with het- 
erogeneous reservation prices, and price-sensitive passengers with heterogeneous valuations of the service. They propose 
a pricing framework and examine how various factors affect the optimal price, wage, and commission with an objective 
of maximizing the platform’s proﬁt or social welfare. They ﬁnd that the optimal price is not necessarily monotonic when 
the driver’s service capacity or passenger waiting cost increases. The platform should use a lower commission ratio as de- 
mand increases, capacity decreases, or passengers become more sensitive to waiting time. Conversely, it should increase its 
commission ratio when the number of drivers and passenger demand increase at about the same rate. Taylor (2018) also 
uses a queueing formulation with a two-point distribution for passenger and driver valuation, derives the demand rate and 
number of drivers in equilibrium for a given price and wage, and ﬁnds that uncertainty in passenger delay sensitivity and 
driver independence may change the intuitive price and wage prescriptions. Hu and Zhou (2019) study the performance of 
a ﬂat commission contract. For a given realized market condition, they show that the joint price and wage optimization 
can be reduced to the one-dimensional problem of solving for the optimal matching quantity, and that the optimal price 
has a U-shaped relationship with the wage. They assume the total transaction volume is a function of aggregated supply 
and potential demand. When the aggregated supply function is concave in the wage rate, they show that a constant com- 
mission ratio can achieve 75% of the optimal proﬁt. Wang et al. (2016) use an aggregate and static approach and show 
the existence and stability of equilibria in the two-sided market. Fang et al. (2017) provide insight into the trade-off be- 
tween revenue maximizing prices and the social welfare maximizing process. They bound the eﬃciency loss under proﬁt 
maximizing prices and show a strong alignment between proﬁt and eﬃciency in practical settings. 
Both demand and supply on ridesourcing platforms have strong temporal patterns. Dynamic pricing, sometimes referred 
to as surge pricing—i.e., pricing which reacts to instantaneous imbalances between real-time demand and supply—is a pow- 
erful tool commonly used by industry practitioners. However, dynamic or surge pricing is controversial, and has been ques- 
tioned by passengers, drivers, scholars, and policy makers. Some studies, such as Hall et al. (2015), Cohen et al. (2016), Guo 
et al. (2018) , and Jiao (2018) , have examined the practices of surge pricing and/or the reactions of different stakeholders us- 
ing real data. Many scholars study the modeling and optimization of dynamic pricing and debate the advantages and disad- 
vantages of dynamic pricing with surge against static pricing. In favor of dynamic or surge pricing, Cachon et al. (2017) study 
several pricing schemes and ﬁnd that the optimal dynamic contract substantially increases the platform’s proﬁt by compar- 
ison with contracts that have a ﬁxed price or ﬁxed wage, although surge pricing is not optimal, it generally achieves nearly 
the optimal proﬁt. Castillo et al. (2017) argue that surge pricing can help to prevent a type of system ineﬃciency, the “wild 
goose chase,” in which matching failure occurs when idle drivers are matched with distant customers and must waste sub- 
stantial pickup time. They show that such a matching failure will cause the trip supply curve bend backwards, while surge 
pricing can suppress demand, allowing the system to avoid this regime. Nourinejad and Ramezani (2019) argue that by re- 
laxing a common constraint that price is higher than wage at all times which is needed in equilibrium formulation, the 
long-term daily proﬁt of the platform using dynamic pricing can be further improved. 
By contrast, Banerjee et al. (2015) study the pricing problem as a queueing-theoretic economic model. They show that 
dynamic pricing does not provide more proﬁt than optimal static pricing with a large market limit. The beneﬁt of dynamic 
pricing, as compared to static pricing, is its robustness to ﬂuctuations in system parameters. Chen and Hu (2019) study the 
130 H. Wang and H. Yang / Transportation Research Part B 129 (2019) 122–155 
behavior of passengers and drivers when they wait strategically for better prices, and show that in the presence of some 
forward-looking behavior, surge pricing underperforms static pricing in terms of platform proﬁt when the market environ- 
ment is stable and the market size is large. Zhong et al. (2019) compare surge pricing and static price queueing from multiple 
perspectives. They argue that (i) surge pricing dominates queueing in terms of consumer surplus, (ii) queueing dominates 
surge pricing in terms of gross merchandise volume, and (iii) when considering response rate and demand satisfaction rate, 
surge pricing should be followed by queueing as demand goes up, and the critical value depends on the characteristics of 
the market. 
Another important feature of ridesourcing pricing is spatial price segmentation, i.e., setting different prices in different 
regions to balance demand and supply in the spatial dimension. Some recent work focuses on such spatial pricing. For ex- 
ample, Bimpikis et al. (2019) consider a spatial pricing problem in a network of locations and show that platform proﬁts 
are higher when the demand pattern is more balanced between locations. They also show that there is no need for the 
platform to discriminate by price when the demand pattern is balanced; by contrast, it is beneﬁcial to set different prices 
for passengers according to their origin when there are demand imbalances. Guda and Subramanian (2019) analyze spatial 
surge pricing and consider that drivers can move between adjacent zones, explicitly accounting for the strategic interaction 
in their decisions to move. They show that spatial surge pricing can be useful even in regions in which supply exceeds 
demand. Interestingly, more drivers can be encouraged to move from a zone with excess drivers by strategically using a 
surge price to throttle demand in that zone. Such strategic surge pricing can increase the total platform proﬁt across zones 
and even be more proﬁtable than offering drivers bonuses to move. Besbes et al. (2018) propose a two-dimensional frame- 
work for the spatial pricing problem, assuming that drivers choose where to relocate in response to an equilibrium between 
prices, travel costs, and driver congestion levels. Interestingly, when considering a surge in demand in a city center, they 
discuss the possibility of creating “damaged regions” through both prices and congestion steering the ﬂow of drivers toward 
the area of high demand. Zha et al. (2018) propose a discrete time geometric matching model and investigate market equi- 
libria under spatial pricing assuming a revenue-maximizing objective. They ﬁnd that the platform may resort to a relatively 
higher price to avoid ineﬃcient supply if spatial price differentiation is not allowed. They propose a commission ratio cap 
on spatial pricing to achieve the second-best outcome making some assumptions of homogeneity. Ma et al. (2018) design 
incentive-aligned pricing mechanisms in the presence of strategic driver behavior with a multi-location, multi-period set- 
ting. They provide a dynamic price that is appropriately smooth in space and time, so that drivers will choose to accept 
their dispatched trips, rather than moving to another area or waiting for higher prices or a better trip. 
An important aspect of the pricing problem is demand elasticity with respect to price, which is a critical input for pric- 
ing problems and is examined in several industry reports. For instance, in the context of conventional taxis, Booz Allen 
Hamilton (2003) reports that the majority of international results for taxi demand elasticity range between −0.2 and −1.0; 
the NSW Independent Pricing & Regulatory Tribunal in Australia (see IPART, 2015 ) assumes an elasticity of −0.8 in the 
Sydney taxi market. The Center for International Economics in Australia ( CIE, 2015 ) reports elasticity of around −1 for Mel- 
bourne, according to a study by the Victorian Taxi Inquiry. The CIE report ﬁnds that the price elasticity of taxi services 
without ridesourcing is −0.8, but where ridesourcing exists, the elasticity is −1.2. It also assumes that the price elastic- 
ity for ridesourcing services is −2.0. Deloitte Access Economics (2016) argues that it is likely that the demand for a single 
ridesourcing company would be more elastic than that for the entire market; that is, consumers would be more responsive 
to a change in price, as they can easily change to another company. We expect more empirical ﬁndings of spatio-temporal 
demand elasticity with respect to price (e.g., Litman, 2017 ) using real data from ridesourcing companies across countries 
and markets, which will provide more reliable inputs and assumptions for pricing models and mechanisms. 
There is much relevant research into the pricing problem in shared transportation systems from different perspectives 
under diverse settings, such as pricing for dial-a-ride problem ( Sayarshad and Chow, 2015 ); pricing for last-mile shared 
rides ( Chen and Wang, 2018a, 2018b ); auction pricing for ridesourcing ( Asghari et al., 2016; Asghari and Shahabi, 2017 ); dy- 
namic pricing with dispatching ( Chen et al., 2017b ); pricing with reservation cancellation ( He et al., 2018 ); and surge pricing 
with strategic timing and information asymmetry ( Abhishek et al., 2018 ). We expect more research into pricing problems 
for ridesourcing systems with diverse settings to, for example, capture big or subtle differences between different service 
options, changing market conditions, short-term and long-term demand behavior, and multiple objectives. The interdepen- 
dence and interaction of prices between ridesourcing platforms and taxis are also worth investigating. 
3.4. Other passenger promotions 
In addition to spatial-temporal dynamic/surge pricing, ridesourcing platforms often use diverse passenger promotions 
to boost both short- and long-term demand. One commonly used promotion is reward and loyalty programs , in which the 
platform provides diverse beneﬁts to passengers based on their usage. Passengers who use ridesourcing services frequently 
may enjoy special discounted prices during speciﬁed times, redeem free trips using their accumulated mileage, and offset 
a portion of the trip fare using rewards. Another commonly used promotion is the referrals bonus : A current passenger can 
recommend the ridesourcing service to a friend who has never used it by sending a message or sharing a referral code. If 
the friend accepts the referral and uses the service, both parties receive a bonus. There are many other promotions adopted 
by platforms. For example, compensation and apology for passengers after a bad experience; philanthropic donations where 
a charitable donation is made based on passenger usage; and bundled trip packages with a discounted fare for a certain 
number of trips within speciﬁed regions during speciﬁed times. 
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Reward schemes and loyalty programs are popular practices across a broad spectrum of industries, including airlines, ho- 
tels, supermarkets, telecommunication, and recently, e-commerce online shopping; see Kim et al. (20 01, 20 04 ); Singh et al. 
(2008); Caminal (2012) ; and Gandomi and Zolfaghari (2013) . In the context of a ridesourcing market, Yang et al. (2018) pro- 
pose a reward scheme integrated with surge pricing: In addition to a certain predetermined allowable range of surge pricing, 
passengers may opt to pay an additional amount on top of the regular surge price to a dedicated reward account during 
peak hours with over-demand, then use the balance in the reward account to compensate for trips during off-peak hours 
with over-supply. This mechanism provides another useful tool to balance demand and supply. They compare scenarios 
with and without such reward schemes from three perspectives: passenger utility, driver income, and platform revenue and 
proﬁt, and ﬁnd that the reward scheme will beneﬁt all three stakeholders under some market conditions. From a markedly 
different perspective, Singh et al. (2017) compare the uptake of discount-based promotions and philanthropic promotions 
(which they call “charity-linked promotions”) for online taxi booking platforms using ﬁeld experiments in Singapore. They 
ﬁnd that take-up rates for charity-linked promotions are not only much smaller than for discount-based promotions but also 
less sensitive to the exact amount involved. This is consistent with the view that the decision to take up a charity-linked 
promotion is driven in part by experiencing a “warm glow” from mere association with giving—i.e., an individual derives 
signiﬁcant utility from the mere act of helping others, independent of the beneﬁt achieved for society. They also ﬁnd that 
charity-linked promotions are taken up disproportionately by people who are already more active customers. 
Other recent work has modeled and compared various passenger promotions. For example, Cohen et al. (2019) use econo- 
metric models to conduct an empirical analysis of referral programs using real data from a ridesourcing platform. They show 
that the probability of making a referral in a given week decreases with the experience level (captured by the number of 
past rides), increases with the current usage intensity (number of rides in the same week), and decreases with the length of 
the inactive period. They also ﬁnd that referral quality, as measured by the number of rides completed by the referred pas- 
senger, increases with experience but is affected by neither current usage nor recency. Cohen et al. (2018) study the effect 
of a passenger’s bad experience or frustration, which may cause the person to stop using the service. They consider long 
waiting times and long travel times as frustrations and examine whether the platform should proactively send compensa- 
tion to users who have experienced a frustration, which they call “frustration-based promotions.” They ﬁnd that sending 
proactive compensation to frustrated passengers is indeed proﬁtable and boosts passengers’ engagement, and works well 
for long waiting times but not for long travel times. Such compensation seems to be more effective than sending the same 
offer to non-frustrated riders, and more effective with frequent users. They also ﬁnd that it is better to send credit for future 
usage rather than waiving the charge or sending an apologetic message. Using a nationwide ﬁeld experiment involving 1.5 
million Uber passengers who experienced late rides, Halperin et al. (2019) ﬁnd that the eﬃcacy of an apology and whether 
it is effective depends on the nature of the apology. Money speaks louder than words; i.e., the best form of apology is to 
include a coupon for a future trip, and in some cases sending an apology is worse than sending nothing at all, particularly 
in the case of repeated apologies. 
Passenger promotion practices by ridesourcing companies are both innovative and down-to-earth across countries and 
markets. We expect more investigation of these diverse types of industry initiatives, regardless of their success or failure. 
Identifying which type of promotion should be sent to which groups of passengers with particular features and character- 
istics warrants further examination. We also expect more empirical ﬁndings concerning the response of passenger behavior 
to different promotions, as well as corresponding economic and decision-making models. 
4. Supply and incentives 
Understanding the patterns of supply and designing appropriate wage and incentive schemes/programs are also prevalent 
research topics in many industries, including ridesourcing systems. In a two-sided market, the supply side of the ridesourc- 
ing platform affects transaction volume, service level and quality, and service price. In this section, we review research 
concerning the supply and incentives for ridesourcing systems in four areas: driver supply models in Section 4.1 , empir- 
ical analysis of supply elasticity in Section 4.2 , other driver behavior in Section 4.3 , and wage and incentive designs in 
Section 4.4 . 
4.1. Driver supply model 
Several studies discuss the general reasons why drivers work in ridesourcing systems, and in particular, the ﬂexibility 
such systems offer. For example, Hall and Krueger et al. (2018) argue that drivers work on the ridesourcing platform largely 
because of the ﬂexibility, the level of compensation, and the fact that earnings per hour do not vary much with the number 
of hours worked. They ﬁnd that Uber’s drivers are more similar in age and education to the general workforce than to taxi 
drivers and chauffeurs. Most of Uber’s drivers had full- or part-time employment before joining Uber, and many continue 
in those positions after starting to drive for Uber, rendering ﬂexibility to set their own hours especially valuable. Drivers 
often cite the desire to smooth ﬂuctuations in their income as one of their reasons for partnering with Uber. Using data on 
hourly earnings for Uber drivers, Chen et al. (2017a) argue that drivers beneﬁt from real-time ﬂexibility in terms of driver 
surplus, which is deﬁned as the excess wage paid by the platform over the driver’s reservation wage. Such ﬂexibility for 
service providers is a key feature of on-demand ridesourcing platforms. However, this ﬂexibility may also cause problems. 
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For example, based on data and interviews in Norway, Leiren and Aarhaug (2016) ﬁnd that online ridesourcing platforms 
may contribute to a loss of service supply in rural areas. 
As freelancers, drivers on ridesourcing platforms make daily decisions regarding whether to work, and if so, when and 
how many hours to work. The participation decision corresponds to service supply at the extensive margin , and the working- 
hours decision corresponds to service supply at the intensive margin . Long before the emergence of smartphone ridesourcing 
platforms, extensive work in the literature of labor economics examined general labor supply models considering both ex- 
tensive and intensive margins, and the design of corresponding wage contracts, incentive schemes, tax policies, and welfare 
design while considering the distinctions between the two margins. Inﬂuential work includes Barzel (1973); Cogan (1981); 
Heckman (1993); Meyer (2002); Saez (2002); Rogerson and Wallenius (2009); Blundell et al. (2011); Chang et al. (2011) ; and 
Cesarini et al. (2017) . 
In the context of on-demand service platforms, a growing literature addresses driver service supply behavior. Speciﬁcally, 
most of the work on the ridesourcing pricing problems (i.e., fare, wage, and commission) discussed in Section 3.3 base their 
assumptions on certain driver behaviors and propose service supply models. Some studies use an aggregated service supply 
that does not differentiate between extensive and intensive margins. For example, Hu and Zhou (2019) assume a continuous 
aggregated supply function that increases with wage rate, and the total transaction volume is a function of the continu- 
ous aggregated supply and the potential demand. Some work has focused on the intensive margin, i.e., drivers’ decisions 
concerning working-hours. For example, Farber (2005) analyzes the probability of a driver stopping work after a particu- 
lar service trip, which essentially examines the working duration at the intensive margin. Zha et al. (2017) assume that 
drivers differ in their preferred start period and work duration. They measure drivers’ disutility when choosing a particular 
start hour and also from cumulative working hours, which is assumed to increase more than linearly with the cumulative 
working hours at the intensive margin. 
Much work in the literature has focused on the extensive margin, i.e., drivers’ decision to participate on a platform. These 
studies examine the total number of active drivers at the extensive margin of on-demand service platforms by modeling the 
decisions of drivers to participate. For example, based on a queue-theoretical model, Banerjee et al. (2015), Bai et al. (2018) , 
and Taylor (2018) assume that a potential service provider participates if and only if his anticipated average earning rate 
from working on the platform is at least equal to his reservation earning rate. Using an augmented newsvendor model, 
Gurvich et al. (2019) assume that each driver’s participation at each period depends on a random threshold, and the distri- 
bution of the threshold is independent between periods. Cachon et al. (2017) assumes a two-period decision for drivers: a 
long-term decision on whether or not to join a platform in the ﬁrst period (which gives a total number of joined drivers, N ), 
and then a short-term decision on whether or not to participate in work at a particular time in the second period (which 
gives a proportion of participating drivers under a realized market condition, G ); then the number of participating drivers 
at a particular time unit is assumed to be N ·G . 
Some work considers both the extensive and intensive margins. For example, Baron (2018) provides micro-foundations for 
strategy analysis by modeling individual drivers at both the intensive and extensive margins, assuming driver’s utility from 
working is a quadratic function of working hours, and the optimal working hours at the intensive margin are determined 
by maximizing net compensation. They show that the elasticity of working hours at the intensive margin increases strictly 
with opportunity cost, so part-time drivers with potentially higher opportunity costs are more elastic to compensation than 
full-time drivers. The elasticity of the number of drivers at the extensive margin is equal to 1. Bimpikis et al. (2019) assume 
that a driver enters an on-demand service platform if the expected lifetime earnings from the platform are greater than a 
positive threshold and chooses a location to maximize the expected lifetime earnings. They assume a simple constant exit 
probability after the completion of each trip to capture the intensive margin. Sun et al. (2019a) propose a service supply 
model that considers drivers’ daily decisions about participation and working hours. They assume that drivers’ participation 
on ridesourcing platforms incurs operating costs, reduces idle time, and brings income; therefore, drivers are making a 
trade-off between the utility from income and leisure time. They analyze drivers’ optimal working decisions and the effect 
of heterogeneity on service supply behavior and supply elasticity. Benjaafar et al. (2018) study labor welfare in an on- 
demand service platform that relies on agents who decide whether and how much to work. Using an equilibrium model 
that accounts for the interaction among price, wage, labor supply, customer delay and demand, they argue that labor pool 
size may have nonmonotonic effects on labor welfare and both customers and workers may beneﬁt by the imposition of an 
effective wage ﬂoor. 
Drivers’ service supply on ridesourcing platforms differs according to both their short- and long-term behavior, which 
may cause a fundamental difference between the design of short-term incentive programs and long-term wage contracts. 
This is an important area for future research. Other research directions include models to capture drivers’ working decisions 
on time-within-day and space-within-city, as well as corresponding spatio-temporal service supply patterns. Models of and 
theories for integrated decisions and the scheduling of full-time job and part-time service supply on ridesourcing platforms 
are also interesting topics for research. 
4.2. Supply elasticity 
Factors such as hourly income rates (i.e., wage rates) affect both drivers’ decisions to participate and their decisions about 
working-hours, so evaluation of the impact of the hourly income rate on service supply is critical. In standard labor eco- 
nomics theory, as introduced by Cahuc et al. (2014) , income rates have two distinct effects on labor supply by inﬂuencing 
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two margins: one is intensive, and relates to the number of hours worked; the other is extensive, and relates to the decision 
to participate or not in the labor market. The study of a driver’s service supply elasticity at both the extensive and intensive 
margins with respect to hourly income rate is critical to the design and operation of driver incentive mechanisms in rides- 
ourcing systems. As Scheiber (2016) points out, labor economists have been debating how drivers make working decisions 
and the corresponding supply elasticity for decades. 
The ﬁrst mainstream research into supply elasticity is by behavioral economists, using reference-dependent theory. The 
most representative work is Camerer et al. (1997) , who use hours worked as the measure of labor supply and all drivers’ 
average hourly income as an instrumental variable to individual driver’s income rate. From NYC taxi driver data, they ﬁnd 
that some drivers are irrational and come into the market with an income target, which implies that drivers will work longer 
hours when driving pays less than usual and shorter hours when it pays more. The corresponding elasticity is negative 
( −0.355 ∼ −0.618) in such a case. Chou (2002) uses a similar method and ﬁnds a negative elasticity ( −0.3 ∼ −0.9) for taxi 
drivers using Singapore survey data. Fehr and Goette (2007) study bicycle messengers’ working hours and effort and ﬁnd a 
negative effort elasticity ( −0.24) and a positive working-hours elasticity (1.34 ∼ 1.50) using a randomized controlled trial. 
Income-target behavior, if it exists, tends to generate a negative elasticity in a range of hourly income rate and undermines 
the beneﬁts of dynamic pricing/wage and/or other bonus incentives for drivers. 
Another strand of mainstream research into supply elasticity is based on neoclassical and/or intertemporal labor supply 
models. The most inﬂuential and representative work is by Farber (2005, 2015 ), who also uses hours worked as the measure 
of labor supply and all drivers’ average hourly income as an instrumental variable to individual driver’s income rate. From 
NYC taxi driver data, Farber ﬁnds that drivers are rational decision makers and typically work longer hours when income 
rates are higher, which provides a positive elasticity (0.32 ∼0.62) and is opposite to the results of Camerer et al. (1997) . 
Using real driver working data from Uber, Chen and Sheldon (2016) and Sheldon (2016) employ a similar method and ﬁnd 
that drivers have a positive elasticity (0.13 ∼0.25) and adjust ﬂexibly to drive more at high surge times. 
Considering both participation and working-hours decisions, Sun et al. (2019b) model the sample self-selection bias of 
driver participation and the endogeneity of income rate using a Heckman two-step method with an exogenous income 
multiplier as the instrumental variable. Using real driver working data from Didi for a city in China, they ﬁnd a positive 
participation elasticity at the extensive margin (0.11 ∼0.52) and a positive working-hours elasticity at the intensive margin 
(0.02 ∼1.04). Angrist et al. (2017) ﬁnd almost zero participation elasticity and positive working hour elasticity (1.2) using 
randomized controlled trial data from Uber. There is also a rich literature concerning labor supply elasticity in other in- 
dustries, such as positive participation and working-hours elasticity for trans-Alaska pipeline workers ( Carrington, 1996 ); 
positive participation elasticity for baseball stadium vendors ( Oettinger, 1999 ); positive participation and working-hours 
elasticity for lobstermen in Florida ( Stafford, 2015 ); and positive participation elasticity for boat owners in southern India 
( Giné et al., 2017 ). 
In general, income-target behavior may undermine the beneﬁts of an emerging sharing economy or on-demand economy 
markets in which tasks are usually dynamically priced. Econometric models, analysis, and estimation of short-term and 
long-term supply elasticity under diverse contexts in ridesourcing systems are important; mitigating endogeneity bias in a 
service supply elasticity model still requires study; and more randomized control trials are needed. In addition, the impacts 
of the time horizon—e.g., hourly vs. daily vs. monthly driver decisions—on the income target and supply elasticity will be 
interesting and challenging topics for future research. 
4.3. Other driver behavior 
Understanding driver behavior is important to improve the planning and operation of the supply/service side of rides- 
ourcing systems. Active drivers show a common behavior when deciding when and where to drive on the platform. 
Chaudhari et al. (2018) show that strategic behavior regarding when and where to drive can substantially increase driver in- 
come. Assuming an earnings-maximization strategy for a driver, they describe a series of dynamic programming algorithms 
for different sets of modeled actions available to drivers and exemplify the models and methods in a large-scale simulation 
of driving for Uber in NYC. They ﬁnd that repositioning throughout the day is the key to maximizing driver earnings, but 
that chasing a surge is typically a misguided, and sometimes costly, move. 
Where to drive to seek passengers when idle (e.g., empty vehicle cruise) is important, but varies substantially between 
drivers. In the context of conventional taxis, various methods are assumed to model bilateral taxi driver and passenger 
searching and meeting behavior on networks. Yang and Wong (1998) and Yang et al. (2002, 2010 ) assume that idle drivers 
will either cruise streets or areas or wait at speciﬁc locations, such as airports, and that their decisions take into ac- 
count the expected searching/waiting time for passengers and the expected revenue per ride from a zone or location. Szeto 
et al. (2019) study the factors that inﬂuence vacant drivers’ customer-search decisions on whether to enter or bypass recom- 
mended areas while cruising along a road with a series of taxi-calling signals. Observational survey data are collected and 
analyzed to understand the travel behavior of vacant taxi drivers, and a sequential binary logistic regression model is pro- 
posed to examine their dynamic decision-making process. The status of taxi-calling signals, which reveal passenger demand 
at locations away from the roadside to cruising vacant taxis, is found to be the most inﬂuential factor encouraging vacant 
taxi drivers to enter sites to pick up passengers. Rong et al. (2017) ﬁnd that top-performing taxi drivers can earn 25% more 
in a given period than those with mediocre seeking strategies. To investigate independent worker’s behavioral biases in the 
context of on-demand service platforms, Jiang et al. (2019) use a combination of behavioral modeling and controlled lab 
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experiments considering driver behavioral factors. They ﬁnd that regret aversion and ignorance of suggestion are the two 
major behavioral factors that inﬂuence drivers’ relocation decisions. Sharing demand information is a better way of com- 
municating demand compared with providing suggested actions to drivers, and the platform may also need to offer extra 
ﬁnancial payment to compensate for drivers’ relocation cost. A rich strand of literature examines the corresponding empty 
vehicle guidance and repositioning, which are discussed in Section 5.4 . 
If there are multiple ridesourcing platforms in the same local market, a driver may drive for multiple platforms at the 
same time and provide ride services for the platform that has a passenger nearby. This is called multi-homing behavior 
of drivers. Liu et al. (2017) study the impact of multi-homing in a ridesourcing market. By comparison with a single- 
homing duopoly, they ﬁnd that multi-homing on either the passenger side or driver side improves overall welfare. However, 
multi-homing drivers potentially beneﬁt themselves at the cost of single-homing drivers. In contrast, multi-homing passen- 
gers beneﬁt themselves as well as single-homing passengers, which represents a more equitable distribution of gains from 
multi-homing. Some recent work examines platform competition strategies given the multi-homing behavior of passengers 
and drivers, such as studies by Cohen and Zhang (2017), Jeitschko and Tremblay (2019), Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2019) , and 
Bryan and Gans (2019) , which are discussed in Section 6.1 . 
Additionally, many studies examine driver behavior from highly diverse perspectives. For example, Lee et al. (2015) ex- 
plore the impact of software algorithms and data-driven management on drivers’ working practices in the context of Uber 
and Lyft. They conduct a qualitative study to describe how drivers respond when algorithms assign work, provide informa- 
tional support, and evaluate driver performance, and how drivers use online forums to make sense of algorithm features; 
for example, a factor that inﬂuenced driver cooperation was whether the assignment made sense to them, which suggests 
that an explanation of why certain assignments were made might be an important feature. Malin and Chandler (2016) ex- 
plore how Uber and Lyft drivers understand their own digital labor. They identify some unusual behavior from interviews 
with drivers; for instance, drivers may ask passengers to get out of the vehicle and cancel the ride when they have con- 
cerns about the vehicle’s safety during the ride, since drivers are not employees of the platform and therefore risk liability. 
Ge et al. (2016) study drivers’ racial and gender discrimination with regard to passengers and observe that removing pas- 
senger names from trip bookings may alleviate the immediate problem, but could introduce other pathways for unequal 
treatment of passengers. In examining how technological innovation in digital platform affects moral hazards and service 
quality, Liu et al. (2018) ﬁnd that Uber drivers overall drive at a lower speed than taxi drivers, and taxi drivers tend to 
detour more relative to Uber drivers on metered airport routes in NYC, particularly when the airport passenger is non-local. 
Schwendau (2017) studies the dangers and self-protective behavior of drivers to understand their fears about the lack of 
safety and security provided by companies, and provides some suggestions from drivers to make the ride safer, such as 
more training by the platform, requiring a proﬁle picture from a passenger, and vehicle dash cameras provided or offset by 
the platform. In the context of taxis, Noulas et al. (2018) ﬁnd that experienced drivers are more likely to pick side streets 
that may help them to navigate away from heavy traﬃc, and demonstrate better routing skills in dense and complex ur- 
ban environments than computer navigation systems. Xu et al. (2018a) study the factors that affect taxi drivers’ response to 
ridesourcing requests. They ﬁnd that taxi drivers working on ridesourcing platforms are more likely to respond to requests 
from the platform with economic incentives (especially a ﬁrm subsidy) and to requests with lower spatio-temporal demand 
intensity or higher spatio-temporal supply intensity when it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd street-hailing passengers. Drivers are more 
likely to respond to requests involving rides that cover a greater geographical distance and to those with a smaller num- 
ber of repeated submissions. With the boom in ridesourcing platforms, we can expect more, either theoretical or empirical, 
studies on driver behavior in the future. 
4.4. Wage and incentives 
Wage and incentive mechanism for drivers affect the supply side of ridesourcing systems, in both the short- and long- 
term. In Section 3.3 , we reviewed the literature on pricing problems for ridesourcing platforms, which include the deter- 
mination of the fare charged to passengers, the wage paid to drivers, the commission withheld by the platform, and the 
interactions and endogeneity between these factors. 
Several studies just focus wage and compensation on the supply side. For example, Angrist et al. (2017) examine the 
different wage structures of conventional taxis and Uber. Speciﬁcally, drivers on Uber pay a proportion of the fare to the 
platform, and conventional taxi drivers make a ﬁxed payment independent of their earnings—usually a weekly or daily 
medallion lease—but keep every fare dollar net of expenses. They argue that the crucial difference between drivers comes 
down to the need to lease a medallion to drive a taxi as opposed to the pro rata fee the platform charges. Using an experi- 
ment that offered random samples of Boston Uber drivers the opportunity to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates 
the commission, they ﬁnd that many high-volume drivers display “lease aversion” and opt for the pro rata scheme, despite 
the better return offered by the lease model for taxis. They also compute the average compensation required to render 
drivers indifferent when choosing between ridesourcing platforms and conventional taxis. The results suggest that drivers 
on ridesourcing platforms gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing. 
To address the spatial-temporal imbalance between demand and supply, ridesourcing platforms often deploy spatial- 
temporal bonus and incentives programs in various formats. One commonly used spatial-temporal incentive is called Boost 
by Uber and PanGu by Didi. Boost multiples drivers’ income by a certain amount for all trips within speciﬁed hotspots 
during speciﬁed times. Boost schemes operate in different zones across the city, while how much Boost the driver can earn 
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depends on when and where they drive. Boost differs from surge pricing/wage in that (i) Boosts only affects the supply 
side, and (ii) Boosts are set in advance and available for longer periods of time. Uber also claims that when both surge 
and boost occur in the same area and at the same time, drivers will receive the higher one, so essentially Boost is like a 
space- and time-dependent guarantee of a minimum surge. Another commonly used incentive program is a Streak bonus 
or consecutive trips bonus. When drivers complete multiple trips within speciﬁed hotspots during speciﬁed times, they will 
receive a Streak bonus and the amount depends on the number of trips that meet certain requirements. There are many 
other incentives programs. For example, Quest is a target-based bonus, i.e., if drivers reach a speciﬁc number of trips during 
a particular period, they unlock certain incentives. In a minimum wage guarantee , platforms top-up driver earnings if their 
earnings are less than a guaranteed amount. 
Some recent works have modeled and evaluated various incentives. For example, Leng et al. (2016) analyze taxi drivers’ 
behavior in response to monetary promotions during a battle between two ridesourcing apps (i.e., Didi and Kuaidi in China 
in 2014) and demonstrate how several important service indices (e.g., travel distance and idle time) of taxi drivers changed. 
They show that the number of taxi trips made by every vehicle per day increases during the money promotion; also, idle 
times become shorter. However, drivers prefer to pick up passengers who travel shorter distances and passengers going to 
“hot” locations, since they could serve more passengers and thus collect more subsidies. Kabra et al. (2016) ﬁnd that over a 
term as short as a week, passenger incentives are more effective than similar driver incentives. In the longer term, such as 
over three months, the opposite is true: Driver incentives are more effective than passenger incentives. This is because of 
the differential stickiness of passengers and drivers to the platform, as well as differential response to evolving service levels. 
Passengers are less sticky on the platform in the long term and more sensitive to their service level. When structuring driver 
incentives, it is more effective to use threshold incentives based on a certain level of usage rather than linear incentives. 
Fang et al. (2018) study a loyalty program for drivers and show that optimal revenue in a heterogeneous market can be 
achieved by a class of multi-threshold loyalty programs that include a simple implementation-friendly structure. They also 
argue that sophisticated loyalty programs that reward drivers through stepwise linear functions outperform simple sign-up 
bonuses that give drivers a one-time reward for participating. 
Like passenger promotions on the demand side, the practice of wage and bonus incentives by ridesourcing companies 
on the supply side are both innovative and down-to-earth across countries and markets. We expect more studies and in- 
vestigation, either empirical ﬁndings or theoretical models, of these diverse types of industry initiatives, regardless of their 
success or failure. 
5. Platform operations 
Ridesourcing platforms employ diverse operational strategies to enable and improve an on-demand shared transportation 
service. These operational strategies largely affect service quality for passengers, working status and income for drivers, 
overall system eﬃciency and platform performance—such as market share, revenue and proﬁt—and social welfare and other 
externalities. In this section, we review research into six areas of platform operations: estimated time of arrival (ETA) in 
Section 5.1 , matching and order dispatching in Section 5.2 , ridesplitting operations in Section 5.3 , empty vehicle guidance 
and repositioning in Section 5.4 , information sharing and disclosure in Section 5.5 , and rating mechanism in Section 5.6 . 
5.1. Estimated time of arrival 
Estimated time of arrival (ETA) is the estimated travel time between an origin and a destination. It is one of the most 
important location-based services for ridesourcing platforms, and is also a key concern for both passengers and drivers. 
It has been used widely as the foundation for many real-time decisions by the platforms, such as matching and order 
dispatching, ridesplitting assignment, routing and navigation, guidance and repositioning, and price and wage estimation. 
An accurate and reliable ETA increases the eﬃciency of the ridesourcing system by reducing the travel cost for users, energy 
consumption, and vehicular pollution. However, this is a challenging task, because ETA is affected by diverse complex factors, 
including spatial correlations, temporal dependencies, and external conditions (e.g., weather, traﬃc lights, congestion; see 
Wang et al., 2018a ). 
Various methods have been used to estimate ETAs using various sources of data. For example, Wu et al. (2004) apply 
support vector regression (SVR) to highway traﬃc data and compare the results with other baseline travel-time prediction 
methods. They ﬁnd that the SVR predictor can substantially reduce both the relative mean errors and root-mean-squared 
errors in predicted travel time, because SVR is believed to perform well for time series analysis with greater generalization 
ability and guaranteed global minima. De Fabritiis et al. (2008) present a large-scale working application of a Floating-Car 
Data (FCD) system. They propose two algorithms, based on artiﬁcial neural networks and pattern-matching, using ﬂoating 
car data designed to perform online short-term predictions of link travel speeds using current and near-past link aver- 
age speeds. Test results show that these approaches are very effective for short-term predictions. Jenelius and Koutsopou- 
los (2013) present a model estimated using maximum likelihood to estimate travel time on urban road networks using 
vehicle trajectories obtained from low frequency GPS probes as observations where vehicles typically cover multiple net- 
work links between reports. The network model separates trip travel times into link travel times and intersection delays 
and allows travel times on different network links to be correlated based on a spatial moving average (SMA) structure. A 
case study of a network in Stockholm shows that link attributes and trip conditions have signiﬁcant effects on travel times, 
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and that there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between segments. Wang et al. (2014) estimate travel times on different 
road segments in different time slots by means of a three-dimensional tensor, using GPS trajectories of vehicles received 
in current time slots and over a period of history in addition to map data sources. They ﬁll in the tensor’s missing values 
using a context-aware tensor decomposition approach combined with geospatial, temporal, and historical contexts learned 
from trajectories and map data. Numerical experiments using GPS trajectories from more than 32,0 0 0 taxis in Beijing over a 
period of two months demonstrate the effectiveness. Woodard et al. (2017) propose a statistical model to predict the distri- 
bution of travel time using GPS data from mobile phones or other probe vehicles, taking into account the variation of local 
traﬃc patterns by time of week. They discuss a case study in the Seattle metropolitan region and ﬁnd that the proposed 
method provides improved interval predictions relative to Bing Maps’ predictions. Leveraging a network optimization frame- 
work and insights, Bertsimas et al. (2019b) develop a method that exploits taxi origin-destination data and other sources of 
traﬃc information tractably to extract travel time estimation. Using synthetic instances, they establish the robustness of the 
algorithm to high variance data and the interpretability of its results. 
Given the availability of large amounts of data resulting from the wide penetration of ridesourcing platforms, machine 
learning techniques, especially deep learning techniques, have played a key role in the estimation of ETA recently. For ex- 
ample, Wang et al. (2018a) present an end-to-end deep learning framework to estimate the complete path travel time. They 
present a geo-convolution operation which is capable of capturing spatial correlations by integrating geographic information 
with classic convolution. By stacking recurrent units on the geo-convolution layer, they also capture temporal dependencies. 
Wang et al. (2018c) formulate ETA as a pure spatial-temporal regression problem using a large set of effective f eatures and 
adapt different existing machine learning models to solve the regression problem. They also propose a wide-deep-recurrent 
(WDR) learning model and jointly train wide linear models, deep neural networks, and recurrent neural networks together. 
They deploy the solutions on Didi’s platform and demonstrate good performance. 
In the future, with more types of data with multiple dimensions from diverse sources, we expect that more statisti- 
cal, econometric, and machine learning techniques will be developed and synergies with structural models to obtain more 
accurate ETA. 
5.2. Matching and order dispatching 
Ridesourcing platforms are a typical two-sided market, so matching demand and supply—i.e., dispatching passenger or- 
ders to drivers—is a key feature of the service. For single-rider services such as UberX and Didi Express, one passenger order 
is dispatched (i.e., matched) to one driver, which is very like the conventional taxi order dispatch. For multi-rider ridesplit- 
ting services such as Uber Pool, Didi Pool, Lyft Line, and Grab Share, multiple passenger orders with similar itineraries may 
be combined and dispatched to one driver. In this subsection, we focus on single-rider matching between one passenger 
and one driver. In Section 5.3 , we focus on multi-rider matching and assignment for ridesplitting services. Note that there 
is a large stream of literature on the matching problem in dynamic ridesharing systems that aim to match travelers with 
similar itineraries and time schedules at short notice, and both passengers and drivers have their own travel needs (see 
Agatz et al., 2012 , for a review). A dynamic ridesharing system is more like peer-to-peer shared travel services such as Didi 
Hitch and Grab Hitch, which are outside the scope of this review. 
Matching and order dispatching algorithms affect the overall performance and eﬃciency of ridesourcing systems greatly. 
A good matching algorithm provides not only better service for passengers, but also an eﬃcient ﬂeet with better utiliza- 
tion and requiring fewer vehicles. For example, Vazifeh et al. (2018) address the minimum ﬂeet problem in an on-demand 
shared transportation service. Given a collection of trips (speciﬁed by origin, destination, and start time), they determine the 
minimum number of vehicles needed to serve all of the trips without incurring any delay for passengers if an ideal order 
dispatching and empty vehicle repositioning system is used. Using taxi trip data from NYC for one year, they ﬁnd that a 
method with near-optimal service levels would allow a 30% reduction in ﬂeet size by comparison with current operations. 
In the context of peer-to-peer dynamic ridesharing, Lee and Savelsbergh (2015) investigate the beneﬁts, complexities, and 
costs of employing a small number of dedicated drivers to serve riders who would otherwise remain unmatched. They ﬁnd 
that the beneﬁts and costs of employing dedicated drivers depend on three main factors: the number of trips in a service 
area, the time ﬂexibility of trips, and the similarity between travel patterns of the trips. The dedicated drivers can be seen 
as a dedicated ﬂeet working on ridesourcing platforms such as Uber and Didi. Although the contexts have some differences, 
these studies provide a reference for how well ridesourcing systems can perform with an ideal matching and dispatching 
algorithm. On the other hand, Feng et al. (2017) build a stylized model of a circular road and compare the average waiting 
times of passengers using various matching mechanisms. Surprisingly, they ﬁnd that the on-demand matching mechanism 
could result in higher or lower eﬃciency than the conventional street-hailing mechanism, depending on the parameters of 
the system. 
Matching and order dispatching pose fundamental challenges to platform operators that are diﬃcult to surmount for 
the following reasons. First, ridesourcing systems are highly dynamic, with time-varying stochasticity and uncertainty in 
decision scenarios, such as those that involve demand and supply. Second, strong endogeneity is present between current 
decisions and future scenarios; matching decisions in the current period will affect demand and supply scenarios strongly in 
subsequent periods. Third, the platform must consider multiple short-term and long-term objectives, such as instant rewards 
from passenger pick-up time and fare charged, midterm service level and ﬂeet eﬃciency, long-term passenger and driver 
fairness and satisfaction, and platform revenue, proﬁt, and reputation; these objectives may conﬂict with each other. And 
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fourth, in addition to these challenges, the scale of the matching problem in ridesourcing systems is large or even huge. 
This causes the curse of dimensionality, with decision variables that can number in the hundreds of thousands (e.g., up to 
10 ∼100 thousand) and even more constraints, which must be considered quickly or even instantaneously. Such a large-scale 
problem requires reliable and high-quality solutions in a very short time—typically, within a few seconds. 
Since the match between one passenger and one driver has a clear bipartite structure, the matching problem per se 
is often modeled using an integer optimization and combinatorial optimization formulation. Due to the stochasticity and 
uncertainty of ridesourcing systems, stochastic programming and robust optimization methods are often adopted. Due to 
the endogeneity between current decisions and future scenarios, dynamic programming models are also used to capture 
the complex state transitions between demand and supply scenarios with decisions. In addition, because of the sophisti- 
cated tradeoffs between multiple short-term and long-term objectives with spatio-temporal characteristics, machine learn- 
ing techniques have been integrated into matching and dispatching algorithms recently to address intractable structures and 
complex estimations of rewards. Finally, because of the large scale of the problem and the strict requirement for computa- 
tional speed, in current industry practice various heuristic algorithms play critical roles in solving these problems quickly in 
real time. 
In the context of taxi order dispatching, much work has been conducted recently using diverse assumptions with differ- 
ent objectives, such as minimizing pick-up time and passenger waiting time, maximizing matched ratio and system proﬁt, 
and minimizing taxi idle distance; see Lee et al. (2004), Wong and Bell (2006), Seow et al. (2010), Miao et al. (2016) , and 
Zhang et al. (2017b) . Many recent studies have addressed matching problems in the speciﬁc context of ridesourcing systems, 
such as Dickerson et al. (2018), Xu et al. (2018b), Ozkan and Ward (2019), Bertsimas et al. (2019a) , and Lyu et al. (2019) . 
Some work on peer-to-peer ridesharing hitch matching is also valuable for ridesourcing systems, such as the stable matching 
proposed by Wang et al. (2017b) . Since the research problems in these papers are mainly standard optimization problems 
that can be summarized well by their objectives, methodologies and approaches, and instance performance, we use Table 2 
to summarize these papers. 
In practice, in addition to greedy matching of pairs of passengers and drivers within the closest distance, batch matching 
is a common strategy used by ridesourcing systems. Instead of dispatching a vehicle immediately an order arrives, platforms 
often hold unserved orders and empty vehicles for a certain matching interval, e.g., 2–10 s, and conduct batch bipartite 
matching. There are two key decision parameters in this batch matching strategy: length of the matching interval and the 
maximum allowed pick-up time/distance (i.e., matching radius) in each matching batch. Intuitively, as the matching interval 
increases, more demand/supply information can be revealed, but more passengers may cancel orders because of long waiting 
times. As the matching radius increases, more pairs can be matched in each batch, but the actual pick-up time/distance may 
also increase. Akbarpour et al. (2018) discuss the thickness of information in dynamic matching markets which is relevant 
to batch matching and corresponding information. They show that if the platform can identify passengers who are about 
to cancel, then waiting to thicken the market substantially reduces the fraction of unmatched passengers. If the platform 
cannot identify such passengers, then matching agents greedily is close to optimal. They specify conditions under which 
local algorithms that choose the right time to match, but do not exploit the global network structure, are close to optimal. 
Liu et al. (2019) argue that a centralized matching algorithm can increase the number of matches by making matches less 
frequently and matching agents more assortatively. Considering the impacts of matching radius, by constructing a double- 
ended queuing model, Xu et al. (2019) prove that the supply curve in the ridesourcing system with a ﬁnite matching radius 
is always backward bending, but a smaller matching radius leads to a weaker bend. They also argue the possibility of 
completely avoiding the bend by adaptively adjusting the matching radius. Further discussion of the matching interval and 
matching radius, as well as insights on implementable matching algorithms, are anticipated. 
There is also a growing literature on the online algorithm for general dynamic matching. For example, 
Baccara et al. (2018) study a dynamic matching problem in which demand units can wait, and there is a trade-off be- 
tween waiting for a thicker market with higher-quality match and incurring higher waiting costs. They show that the wel- 
fare difference between centralized matching and a discretionary process can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. 
Truong and Wang (2018) study dynamic matching, in which supply units can wait a deterministic amount of time, whereas 
demand units must be matched irrevocably upon arrival to existing supply units if any, or rejected. They propose an on- 
line algorithm with a worst-case performance guarantee and prove an upper bound on the best performance guarantee. 
Ashlagi et al. (2019) study dynamic matching in an inﬁnite-horizon stochastic market while considering both hard- and 
easy-to-match agents who can be matched either bilaterally or indirectly through chains. They propose an asymptotic ap- 
proach and compute tight bounds on the limit of waiting time under myopic policies. Ashlagi et al. (2018) study the problem 
of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after some time period without a priori information 
about the match values or arrival times. They propose a 1/4-competitive algorithm and also show that no algorithm is 
1/2-competitive. 
In the future, deriving eﬃcient matching models and algorithms with both good theoretical performance guarantees 
and practical computational advantages will be extremely valuable. Speciﬁcally, computational algorithms to solve match- 
ing problems in a hybrid context with stochastic programming, dynamic programming, and machine learning, are worth 
investigating. 
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Table 2 
Summary of some papers on matching and order dispatching. 
Literature Objective Methodology and approach Instance performance 
Taxi order dispatch 
Lee et al., al.(2004) Minimize pick-up time Greedy matching with shortest pick-up time 
considering real-time traﬃc conditions 
Simulation using Singapore taxi data. Reduce more 
than 50% passenger pick-up time and average 
travel distance 
Wong and Bell (2006) Minimize passenger request waiting 
time 
Heuristic with rolling horizon considering 
anticipation of future requests and traﬃc 
conditions 
Simulation using synthetic instances. Perform well 
but the “curse of dimensionality” is a bottleneck 
Seow et al. (2010) Maximize quality-of-service or 
minimize total cost 
Multi-agent taxi dispatch architecture with linear 
assignment 
Simulation using synthetic instances. Reduce 
customer waiting time and empty taxi cruising 
time 
Miao et al. (2016) Maximize matching ratio with 
minimum taxi idle driving distance 
Receding horizon control framework using 
spatio-temporally demand/supply, real-time GPS 
location, and occupancy information 
Simulation using San Francisco taxi data. Reduce 
average total idle distance by 52% and supply 
demand ratio error by up to 45% 
Zhang et al. (2017b) Maximize global order success rate 
considering driver acceptance 
Linear logistic regression and gradient boosted 
decision tree to predict driver acceptance; 
hill-climbing to dispatch orders 
Simulation in Didi online taxi system. Improve 
order success rate from 80% to 84% 
Ridesourcing matching 
Wang et al. (2017b) Multiple objectives: systemwide 
measures and individual beneﬁts 
Stable matching with rolling horizon Simulation using Atlanta ridesharing data. Increase 
stability of solutions a lot at the cost of a small 
degradation in systemwide measures 
Dickerson et al. (2018) Maximize a generic matching reward LP-based adaptive algorithm Simulation using NYC yellow cabs data. Online 
competitive ratio of 1/2 − epsilon for any given 
epsilon > 0 
Xu et al., al.(2018b ) Maximize an overall global gain Combinatorial optimization with reinforcement 
learning considering immediate rewards and 
future gains 
Testing on Didi platform. Improve platform’s 
revenue by a range of 0.5% to 5% in some cities in 
China 
Ozkan and Ward (2019) Maximize the total cumulative 
number of matchings 
Continuous linear program (CLP) and linear 
program (LP) based policy 
Simulation using synthetic instances. Asymptotic 
optimality of CLP-based policy and LP-based 
policy under some conditions 
Bertsimas et al. (2019a) Maximize total proﬁt A backbone algorithm with a restricted set of 
candidate actions for a sparser problem 
Simulation using NYC yellow cabs data. Outperform 
some existing heuristics in large-scale cases 
Lyu et al. (2019) Multiple objectives: platform revenue, 
pick-up time, service quality 
Debt-based optimization with dynamically adjusted 
weights on multiple objectives 
Simulation using Didi data. Improve service quality 
and platform revenue with a slight sacriﬁce of 
pick-up time 
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5.3. Ridesplitting operations 
Ridesplitting services—i.e., transportation services with multi-rider trips that combine passenger orders with close 
itineraries—are becoming steadily more important and prove of great value, especially during peak demand hours. Uber 
Pool, Didi Pool, Grab Share, and Lyft Line can serve more demand using limited vehicles or serve certain ﬁxed levels of de- 
mand using fewer vehicles for fewer trips and a shorter cumulative trip length. To study the potential impacts of ridesplit- 
ting, Santi et al. (2014) introduce the notion of a shareability network, which models the collective beneﬁts of ridesplit- 
ting as a function of passenger inconvenience and computes optimal sharing strategies eﬃciently. They show that in a 
ridesplitting service with increasing but still low passenger discomfort, cumulative trip length can be cut by 40% or more 
for taxi trips in NYC. d’Orey et al. (2012) perform an empirical evaluation of ridesplitting taxis using simulation and show 
that full deployment of ridesplitting taxis provides an increase of 48% on the average occupancy per traveled kilometer. 
Korolko et al. (2018) consider a mechanism with joint optimization of dynamic pricing and dynamic waiting for ridesplitting 
passengers and determine the passenger waiting window. From simulations using Uber data, they ﬁnd that the mechanism 
can mitigate price variability and increase capacity utilization, trip throughput, and welfare. 
To generate value better from ridesplitting services, platforms must address operational challenges regarding how to as- 
sign multiple passengers/orders to a driver given stochastic and dynamic demand and supply information. Platforms must 
consider multiple objectives, such as additional waiting/delay times and detour travel distances for passengers, total travel 
distance and overall occupancy for drivers, number of served orders, and system revenue and proﬁt. The diﬃculties and chal- 
lenges of single-rider matching problems—stochasticity and uncertainty, endogeneity between current decisions and future 
scenarios, sophisticated tradeoffs between multiple objectives, and the quick response required for large-scale systems—are 
also faced by operators on multi-rider ridesplitting operations. As in Section 5.2 , we use Table 3 to summarize some re- 
cent papers on multi-rider matching and assignment for shared-taxi and/or ridesplitting systems; see Santos and Xavier 
(2013), Hosni et al. (2014), Ma et al. (2015), Pelzer et al. (2015), Jung et al. (2016), Alonso-Mora et al. (2017), Qian et al. 
(2017), Korolko et al. (2018) , and Simonetto et al. (2019) . These studies have been conducted using diverse assumptions 
with different objectives, such as minimizing passenger waiting/delay time and detour, minimizing vehicle travel distance 
and mileage, maximizing the number of served requests, and maximizing system proﬁt and welfare. In the literature, mixed 
integer linear programming (MILP) is often used to formulate the problem, while heuristics, such as simulated annealing and 
adaptive searching algorithms, are often deployed to solve the problem in real time with good computational speed. From 
the numerical examples in these papers, we can identify the signiﬁcant potential beneﬁts offered by ridesplitting services. 
To reduce waiting delay and detours, some platforms also require ridesplitting passengers to meet at speciﬁc locations 
for easy pick-up and quick boarding. In these cases, the choice of meeting points are important for user experience and 
system eﬃciency. Work on meeting points in the context of peer-to-peer ridesharing systems are worth referring to; for 
example, Stiglic et al. (2015) introduce a ridesharing system with meeting points instead of pick-ups or drop-offs at a se- 
ries of points. They validate the eﬃciency in terms of number of shared trips and system-wide travel distance savings. 
Aïvodji et al. (2016) consider the cost of ridesharing user privacy when setting meeting points, and develop a privacy pre- 
serving procedure to deploy meeting points without sacriﬁcing system usage. Experiments carried out on a real transporta- 
tion network demonstrate that it is possible to achieve a trade-off in which both privacy and utility levels are satisfactory. 
In ridesourcing systems, preselection of meeting points in a static setting and real-time selection of meeting points in 
a dynamic setting both merit exploration. Another interesting research direction is routing in-service vehicles with avail- 
able seats to increase the probability of them being shared and to improve the overall vehicle occupancy, given limited 
detour from the route and passenger inconvenience. We also expect more empirical ﬁndings on general demand and sup- 
ply patterns and diverse passenger and driver behavior in ridesplitting services (e.g., passenger discriminatory attitudes in 
Moody et al., 2019 , and impacts on ridesplitting from delay, detours, degraded travel time reliability, and built environ- 
ment factors in Li et al., 2019 ). Additionally, as discussed by Shaheen and Cohen (2019) , policies related to and support for 
shared ride services, including ridesplitting services—for instance, infrastructure and access to public rights-of-way, such as 
park-and-ride-facilities, HOV lanes, and loading zones—also warrant examination. More importantly, the pricing and fare- 
splitting mechanism for shared-ride passengers is critical for ridesplitting services (e.g., design price-service menus in Jacob 
and Roet-Green, 2018 ). Given that current practices for passenger fare-splitting and ridesplitting driver wage and incentives 
are typically simple and immature, future avenues for research include modeling fare-splitting, wages, and incentive design, 
along with ridesplitting matching and in-service vehicle routing. 
5.4. Empty vehicle guidance and repositioning 
In addition to matching and order dispatching, a critical operational strategy that platforms focus on is guidance to and 
repositioning of empty vehicles awaiting new passengers. Speciﬁcally, as introduced in Section 4.3 , idle drivers and empty 
vehicles behave very differently when they are not serving passengers. Some tend to stay and wait in certain places, some 
tend to cruise the city randomly, and some may go to particular target places that they anticipate will offer a higher chance 
to get orders in a short time, or a higher chance of high-value orders. How to improve the guidance and repositioning of 
these idle drivers and empty vehicles awaiting new passengers from a system-wide perspective is important to increase the 
system eﬃciency. With an ideal repositioning and matching strategy, Vazifeh et al. (2018) demonstrates a 30% reduction in 
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Table 3 
Summary of some papers on ridesplitting matching and assignment. 
Literature Objective Methodology and approach Instance performance 
Ridesplitting matching and 
assignment 
Santos and Xavier (2013) Maximize the number of served 
requests and minimize cost paid by 
the served passengers 
Greedy randomized adaptive search procedure Simulation using Illinois survey data. Save 
average of 18.58% cost for each travel 
request 
Hosni et al. (2014) Maximize total proﬁt Mixed integer programming with Lagrangian 
decomposition and heuristics 
Simulation using synthetic instances. Provide 
tighter bounds than CPLEX in shorter 
computational times 
Ma et al. (2015) Minimize increase in travel distance Single-side and dual-side searching 
algorithms with taxi scheduling 
Simulation using Beijing taxi data. Reduce 
11% in total travel distance and 7% in taxi 
fare per rider when the ratio of requests to 
taxis is 6 
Pelzer et al. (2015) Minimize total mileage driven with 
limited detours 
Divide network into distinct partitions that 
deﬁne the search space for ride matches 
Simulation using Singapore taxi data. Reduce 
42% number of trips, save 230,000 km in 
daily mileage, outperform greedy method 
Jung et al. (2016) Minimize passenger travel time and 
maximize system proﬁt 
Hybrid simulated annealing Simulation using Korea Transport Institute 
(KOTI) regional transportation planning 
model. Increase productivity and improve 
system eﬃciency 
Alonso-Mora et al. (2017) Minimize sum of delays Greedy assignment improved by constrained 
optimization 
Simulation using NYC taxi data. 15% taxi of 
capacity 10 or 22.5% of capacity 4 can serve 
98% demand with 2 to 3 min waiting time 
and 2 to 3 min trip delay 
Qian et al. (2017) Maximize total saved travel miles Integer linear programming converted into an 
equivalent graph problem considering 
incentives for taxi ridesplitting 
Simulation using NYC, Wuhan, and Shenzhen 
taxi data. Save over 47% of total taxi trip 
mileage with a proper level of incentives 
Korolko et al. (2018) Maximize welfare for drivers and 
passengers 
A dynamic waiting mechanism (decide 
passenger waiting and walking before 
dispatch) with dynamic pricing 
Simulation using Uber data in San Francisco. 
Mitigate price variability and increase 
capacity utilization, trip throughput, and 
welfare 
Simonetto et al. (2019) Minimize a general cost such as 
detour cost 
Linear programming with ﬂeet reactive 
rebalancing and insertion cost given by 
dial-a-ride heuristic 
Simulation using NYC taxi data and 
Melbourne metropolitan dataset. Similar 
service level as state-of-the-art algorithm 
but faster computation 
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ﬂeet size, and Santi et al. (2014) a 40% reduction in cumulative trip length in a ridesplitting situation, using taxi trip data 
from NYC. 
One way to guide empty vehicles is to provide historical and/or real-time demand information to drivers. In the context 
of taxi guidance, Powell et al. (2011) study a so-called spatio-temporal proﬁtability (STP) map to guide cruising taxicabs. 
They claim that the STP map is useful in guiding for better proﬁtability by showing a positive correlation between the 
cruising proﬁtability score based on the STP map and the actual proﬁtability of taxicab drivers by experiments using Shang- 
hai taxi data. In the context of ridesourcing systems, Lu et al. (2018) study the short-run effect of displaying a surge pricing 
heat map to Uber drivers. Using a natural experiment and difference-in-difference approach, they ﬁnd that the ability to see 
a surge pricing heat map has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on drivers’ decisions to relocate and their revenue: The heat 
map explains 10% −60% of Uber drivers’ self-positioning decisions and increases drivers’ revenue on surged trips by up to 
70%. Afeche et al. (2018) study the interplay between passenger admission control and driver repositioning using a steady- 
state ﬂuid network model and argue that it may be optimal to reject demand at the low-demand location strategically, even 
though there is an excess of drivers, to induce repositioning to the high-demand location. They evaluate performance in this 
context and show that the beneﬁts may be more signiﬁcant when capacity is moderate and when cross-location demand 
imbalance is signiﬁcant. 
In addition to demand information display, platforms can provide direct guidance and relocation suggestions to idle 
drivers. Godfrey and Powell (20 02a, 20 02b ) propose an adaptive dynamic programming algorithm for dynamic ﬂeet manage- 
ment with single-period and multi-period travel times, which is valuable for ﬂeet guidance and repositioning in ridesourcing 
systems. Recently a literature on optimization models and algorithms for empty vehicle routing and repositioning for both 
taxi and ridesourcing systems has arisen; see Braverman et al. (2016), Zhang and Pavone (2016), Wallar et al. (2018), Iglesias 
et al. (2018), Iglesias et al. (2019) , and Yu et al. (2019b) ; machine learning techniques, particularly reinforcement learning 
algorithms, have been applied, such as Wen et al. (2017), Gao et al. (2018) , and Lin et al. (2018) . These studies have been 
conducted with diverse assumptions and different objectives, such as minimizing the imbalance between supply and de- 
mand, minimizing the number of rebalancing vehicles, minimizing ﬂeet size, maximizing the number of served requests, 
and maximizing driver and system proﬁt. As in Section 5.2 , we use Table 4 to summarize the objectives, methodologies and 
approaches, and instance performance for these papers. 
For future research directions, operations related to empty vehicle guidance and repositioning could be more easily in- 
tegrated with other operational strategies and decisions, such as matching and order dispatching, ridesplitting assignment, 
information sharing, monetary tools such as pricing and wage incentives, and parking provision to vacant ridesourcing vehi- 
cles (e.g., Xu et al., 2017 ). The eﬃcient operation of empty vehicles is critical—and even essential—for transportation services 
that will use emerging autonomous ﬂeets with driverless vehicles, which are expected to be available for use by both in- 
dustry companies and the general public in the next few decades. 
5.5. Information sharing and disclosure 
The centralized planners and operators of ridesourcing systems employ historical and real-time information from both 
passengers and drivers to connect demand and supply better. The availability of information for platform operators raises 
two questions: (1) How much information about passengers should be displayed to drivers, and vice versa; and (2) how the 
privacy of passengers and drivers can be protected given necessary information sharing and disclosure. 
What information should be collected and how it should be revealed to users are critical choices for system eﬃciency 
and user experience. Different platforms use diverse practices in different regions. Some studies examine information-reveal 
mechanisms and their impacts on ridesourcing platforms. For example, Rosenblat and Stark (2016) describe Uber drivers’ 
“blind passenger acceptance and minimum fare” in some cities; i.e., drivers are not shown destination or fare informa- 
tion before they accept a ride. On one hand, hiding the destination before a driver chooses to accept or decline a ride 
request can potentially prevent destination-based discrimination; on the other, it can also foster reduced wages for drivers. 
Romanyuk (2017) develops a model for information intermediation faced by a generic platform to connect buyers and sellers. 
The author shows that full information disclosure is ineﬃcient because of potential excessive rejection by sellers: a simple 
policy with partial disclosure to restore full eﬃciency when the platform observes the sellers’ preferences, and a disclosure 
policy to maximize total surplus when sellers’ preferences are unknown to the platform. Romanyuk also develops an ap- 
proach to solve the information disclosure problem with heterogeneous and forward-looking sellers. Chu et al. (2018) study 
ridesourcing platforms that broadcast passenger request’s origin and destination to idle drivers, who accept or ignore the 
request depending on the proﬁtability considerations. They show that providing such information may reduce drivers’ equi- 
libirum proﬁt, hence information provision is a double-edged sword: the drivers may choose to take more proﬁtable re- 
quests via "strategic idling". They also show that routing more proﬁtable requests to drivers according to the "shortest idle 
server ﬁrst" policy while routing less proﬁtable requests according to either the "random routing" policy or the "longest idle 
server ﬁrst" policy can align the incentives and achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome for the systems. Yaraghi and Ravi (2017) note 
that more information shared can lead to greater trust between users, but it can also lead to racial and gender biases. 
Lingenbrink and Iyer (2018) formulate an inﬁnite linear program to study optimal information sharing in an unobserv- 
able single-server queue offering service at a ﬁxed price to a Poisson arrival of delay-sensitive customers. They show that 
the optimal signaling mechanism requires the service provider to conceal information strategically in order to incentivize 
customers to join, and a binary signaling mechanism with a threshold structure is optimal. Romanyuk and Smolin (2019) 
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Table 4 
Summary of some papers on empty vehicle guidance and repositioning. 
Literature Objective Methodology and approach Instance performance 
Empty vehicle guidance 
and repositioning 
Godfrey and Powell (2002a, 
2002b ) 
Maximize expected proﬁts over ﬁnite 
horizon 
Adaptive dynamic programming algorithm with 
nonlinear value functional approximations 
Simulation using deterministic and stochastic 
synthetic instances. Produce high-quality 
solutions quickly 
Braverman et al. (2016) Maximize a systemwide utility 
function 
A ﬂuid-based optimization problem on a 
queueing network. An optimal routing policy 
with an upper bound 
Simulation using Didi data. Show beneﬁts of 
ﬂuid-based optimal routing policy compared 
to various other policies 
Zhang and Pavone (2016) Minimize the number of rebalancing 
vehicles 
A linear optimization program model on a 
closed Jackson network with passenger loss 
Simulation using NYC taxi data. Meet current 
demand in Manhattan using 8000 vehicles 
(i.e., 60% of current ﬂeet) 
Wen et al. (2017) Maximize the expected number of 
served requests considering 
rebalancing cost 
A reinforcement learning approach that adopts 
a deep Q network 
Simulation using data in London. Outperform 
local anticipatory method by reducing 14% 
ﬂeet size with little extra vehicle distance 
Gao et al. (2018) Maximize total proﬁt of a cabdriver in 
a working day 
Markov decision process for the whole taxi 
driving sequence with Q learning algorithm 
Simulation using Beijing taxi data. Improve 
proﬁts and eﬃciency for drivers and increase 
opportunities for passenger to ﬁnd taxi 
Lin et al. (2018) Maximize gross merchandise volume 
of the platform 
Deep reinforcement learning with two 
algorithms: contextual deep Q-learning and 
contextual multi-agent actor-critic 
Simulation using Didi data in Chengdu. 
Outperform state-of-the-art approaches 
Wallar et al. (2018) Maximize the number of requests that 
vehicles are able to serve 
Integer linear program on discretized regions 
with demand estimation from an 
inhomogeneous Poisson process 
Simulation using NYC taxi data. Serve 99.8% of 
requests using 3000 vehicles with 
signiﬁcantly reduced waiting time and in-car 
delay 
Iglesias et al. (2018) Minimize vehicle rebalancing, 
passenger waiting and dropping 
costs 
Model predictive control algorithms that 
leverage short-term forecasts of customer 
demand from LSTM neural network 
Simulation using Didi data. Outperform a 
state-of-the art algorithm with up to 89.6% 
reduction in mean customer waiting time 
Iglesias et al. (2019) Minimize the number of serving and 
rebalancing vehicles on the road 
A closed multi-class BCMP queuing network. 
Linear programming for the inﬁnite ﬂeet size 
Simulation using NYC taxi data. Asymptotically 
recover existing models based on network 
ﬂow approximation 
Yu et al. (2019b) Maximize long-term expected proﬁt 
over working period 
Markov Decision Process solved by value 
iteration algorithm utilizing parallelized 
matrix operations 
Simulation using Shanghai taxi data. Improve 
average unit proﬁt (by 23% and 8.4%) and 
occupancy rate (by 23.8% and 8.3%) over 
random walk and local hotspot heuristic 
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consider short-lived buyers who arrive on a platform over time and are randomly matched with sellers. The sellers stay on 
the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. They argue that if sellers are homogeneous, then coarse infor- 
mation policies can restore eﬃciency; if sellers are heterogeneous, then the optimal information disclosure policy depends 
on seller payoff functions. 
The eﬃciency of sharing information also comes with concerns about privacy for users, such as location privacy. Some re- 
search examines offering privacy-preserving ridesourcing services, which are particularly important in peer-to-peer rideshar- 
ing hitch services. For example, Rigby et al. (2013) discuss a dynamic, intuitive interface technique called “launch pads”
and a centralized system architecture, which together simplify the ride-matching process while preserving location privacy. 
Aïvodji et al. (2016) develop a privacy-preserving service to compute meeting points (i.e., pick-up and drop-off points) such 
that each user remains in control of his location data. They propose a decentralized architecture providing strong security 
and privacy guarantees and integrate privacy-enhancing technologies and multimodal shortest path algorithms to compute 
mutually interesting meeting points for both drivers and passengers privately. Experiments demonstrate that the privacy- 
preserving approach does not impact the quality of solutions signiﬁcantly and provides lower running time as an additional 
beneﬁt. Hallgren et al. (2017) develop secure multi-party computation techniques for endpoint and trajectory matching, es- 
tablish formal privacy guarantees and investigate how different riding patterns affect the privacy, utility, and performance 
trade-offs between approaches based on the proximity of endpoints or the proximity of trajectories. They show the effective- 
ness of this approach using real data from the NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission. For future research, we anticipate more 
empirical evidence on and theoretical models of passenger and driver behavior—in terms of user reaction and privacy and 
system performance and eﬃciency—under different information-sharing mechanisms in different options for ridesourcing 
services. 
5.6. Rating mechanism 
Ratings, of both drivers and passengers, is an innovative feature and function in ridesourcing systems. The rise of rides- 
ourcing systems has led to a previously unrated transportation service being rated, providing measure of quality of service. 
To some extent, realization of transportation services on ridesourcing platforms and interactions between passengers and 
drivers rely on trust and endorsement from the platforms, while the rating system helps to digitize “word of mouth” by 
aggregating information from both passengers and drivers and serves as an endorsement from the platform. Long before 
the arrival of ridesourcing systems, some work in the literature discuss the promise and challenges of general online feed- 
back systems (e.g., see Dellarocas, 2003 ). In the ridesourcing systems, ratings inﬂuence the behavior of both passengers and 
drivers; they also, in some cases, play a key role in the priority of order dispatching and even whether drivers can work on 
the platform. 
The wide use of ratings by ridesourcing platforms offer signiﬁcant value and beneﬁts. For example, Thierer 
et al. (2015) argue that the sharing economy, through the use of the Internet and real-time reputational feedback mech- 
anisms, is providing a solution to the “lemons problem” that many regulators have spent decades attempting to overcome. 
The lemons problem refers to the situation in which high-quality service providers leave a market because potential buyers 
are unable to assess the quality of service, and consequently depressing the average quality of service in the market. The 
rating system on ridesourcing platforms essentially provides more information about the quality of the product (i.e., ride 
service), and hence helps to mitigate or even solve the lemons problem. Rosenblat and Stark (2016) argue that by rating 
drivers, passengers are empowered to act as middle managers over drivers, whose ratings impact their employment eligi- 
bility directly. This redistribution of managerial oversight and power away from formalized middle management and toward 
passengers is part of a broader trend in the ﬂexible labor market: Platforms can create expectations about their service that 
drivers must fulﬁll through the mediating power of the rating system. Jin et al. (2018a) study bilateral rating systems (BRS) 
on sharing economy platforms in which service providers and customers rate each other, and compare BRS with the unilat- 
eral rating systems (URS). They argue that BRS facilitates supply-demand balancing and can improve the average quality of 
passengers that drivers encounter, while the impacts on the average quality of drivers that passengers may face depend on 
passengers’ valuation of the service. They also ﬁnd that BRS always improves drivers’ welfare but may reduce the platform’s 
revenue. Since drivers’ ability to reject low rating passengers in BRS can help remove excess demand and hence alleviate 
the demand-supply imbalance issue, the passengers’ welfare may also be improved. 
Despite these beneﬁts, rating systems may also encounter problems, such as inﬂated, unfair, or biased ratings, and hence 
can cause unexpected outcomes. For example, Filippas et al. (2018) show that the effectiveness of a rating system will 
deteriorate over time because of the inﬂation of ratings. They argue that raters (e.g., passengers) feel pressure to leave 
“above average” ratings for the rated sellers (e.g., drivers), which in turn pushes the average higher. This pressure stems from 
raters’ desire not to harm the rated seller. As the potential to harm is what makes ratings effective, reputation systems, as 
currently designed, sow the seeds of their own irrelevance. Kapoor and Tucker (2017) use data from a ridesourcing platform 
in India and empirically evaluate the performance and consequence of reviews that are unfair or unrepresentative of the true 
quality provided. They ﬁnd that if passengers experience a ride cancellation, they are more likely to blame the replacement 
driver unfairly; drivers are more likely to respond negatively to a bad rating, and subsequently receive bad ratings if they 
were blameless for the previous negative rating. They also show that these potentially unfair ratings can motivate drivers to 
leave the platform, suggesting a broader negative effect of unfair negative ratings on platform participation. In a different 
context of hotel ratings, Eslami et al. (2017) study how users discover and behave in response to a biased rating. They study 
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whether, how, and in what ways users perceive and manage this bias. They also show that users’ awareness of biased rating 
might motivate them to reverse-engineer the rating, correct the bias, and demonstrate broken trust. This study could be 
valuable in studying the impact of different rating mechanisms on ridesourcing platforms. Stemler (2017) argues that the 
platform might be relying on the collective bias of the crowd to its detriment, instead of relying on the wisdom of the crowd. 
Rosenblat et al. (2017) point out that a rating system may represent a potential avenue for employment discrimination. 
Speciﬁcally, they use the Uber platform as a case study to explore how bias may creep into evaluations of drivers through 
rating systems. While platforms are legally prohibited from making employment decisions based on protected characteristics 
of drivers, their reliance on potentially biased passenger ratings to make material determinations may nonetheless have a 
disparate impact on employment outcomes. 
There are also some studies of the behavior of both drivers and passengers regarding rating systems. For example, using 
receipt data from Uber, Kooti et al. (2017) ﬁnd that matching passengers and drivers inﬂuences ratings: passengers and 
drivers with smaller age differences result in higher ratings. In future, we anticipate more empirical ﬁndings and theoretical 
models, and also anticipate research and practices to reduce unexpected problems with rating systems. The combination 
of ratings with other operational strategies, such as order dispatching, information sharing, pricing, and incentives design 
warrant future exploration. 
6. Competition, impacts, and regulations 
The boom in the ridesourcing industry entails tough competition between multiple platforms. It is unsurprising that it 
has signiﬁcant direct impacts on existing transportation services, but it has also introduced other societal and environmen- 
tal impacts. As a pioneer in the general sharing economy, regulation of the ridesourcing market is critical and has attracted 
strong attention from industry players, users, scholars, and policy makers. In this section, we review research into plat- 
form competition in Section 6.1 , the impacts and interactions of ridesourcing platforms on other transportation services in 
Section 6.2 , other societal and environmental impacts in Section 6.3 , and a brief discussion of regulations in Section 6.4 . 
6.1. Competition 
Multiple ridesourcing platforms may exist and compete in a local market. They compete not only on the demand side 
for passengers, but also on the supply side for ﬂexible self-scheduling drivers who may work for multiple platforms. For 
example, Didi and Uber were engaged in ﬁerce competition in China until late 2016, and Grab and Uber did the same in 
Southeast Asia until mid-2018. As of mid-2019, Uber and Lyft compete in the US; Bolt and Uber in Europe; Grab and Go-Jek 
in Southeast Asia; Didi and Uber in Australia; Careem and Uber in the Middle East; Ola and Uber in India; and Cabify, 99 Taxi 
and Uber in Brazil. Some studies have compared platforms and/or provided case studies of platform performance in speciﬁc 
markets. For example, Jiang et al. (2018) compare Uber, Lyft, and conventional taxis with respect to several key market 
features (e.g., supply, demand, price, and waiting time) in San Francisco and NYC to investigate competitive dynamics, and 
ﬁnd that transportation infrastructure and socioeconomic features have substantial effects on market features. Other case 
studies include Wirtz and Tang (2016) on Uber’s development and growth, ﬁrst in the US and then in China and the causes 
of its failure in China; and Täusc her and Kietzmann (2017) on some failed ﬁrms in the sharing economy in the US, Germany 
and India. 
A rich strand of economics studies of competition between two-sided platforms includes the work of Rochet and Ti- 
role (2003) , Armstrong (2006) , and Armstrong and Wright (2007) . The recent surge in ridesourcing systems has attracted 
attention to driver/passenger multi-home behavior and corresponding platform competition. For example, Jeitschko and 
Tremblay (2019) consider two-sided markets in which consumers (e.g., passengers) and ﬁrms (e.g., drivers) endogenously 
determine whether they single-home (patronize only one platform), or multi-home (join competing platforms). They ﬁnd 
that the standard competitive bottleneck allocation in which all consumers single-home and all ﬁrms multi-home is al- 
ways an equilibirum, and allocations with a mix of multi-homing and single-homing on both sides of the market. They also 
ﬁnd that lower prices coincide with multi-homing: agents ﬁnd multi-homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. 
Bryan and Gans (2019) examine competition between ridesourcing platforms in which platforms compete on both price and 
the waiting time induced with idled drivers. They show that when passengers are the only agents who multi-home, idleness 
is lower in duopoly compared with the case in which passengers face a monopoly ridesourcing platform. When drivers and 
passengers multi-home, idleness falls further to zero as it involves costs for each platform that is appropriated, in part, by 
their rival. Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2019) explore the allocative effects of change from single- to multi-homing. They argue 
that it is not always true that multi-homing hurts the side that can multi-home while beneﬁting the other side, as either 
the opposite may happen or both sides may beneﬁt. 
Much work focuses on platform competition. For example, Zha et al. (2016) argue that under the ﬁrst-best scenario, prof- 
its for the platform and drivers will be negative if the matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale and the cost 
function of the platform shows economies of scale; the second-best scenario may be achieved by regulating the commission 
charged by the platform alone under some conditions; and competition does not necessarily lower the price level or improve 
social welfare. Cohen and Zhang (2017) study the setting in which two-sided platforms choose their prices and wages si- 
multaneously to compete for both sides of the market, and show that a unique equilibrium exists and can be obtained using 
a tatonnement scheme. They explore the impact of “coopetition” between two-sided platforms—i.e., the business strategy 
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of cooperating with competitors—and analyze the outcome if competing platforms engage in a proﬁt-sharing contract by 
introducing a new joint service. The authors ﬁnd that a well-designed proﬁt-sharing contract will beneﬁt every party in the 
market, including passengers, drivers, and both platforms. Fang et al. (2018) study platform competition with driver loyalty 
programs and show that the degree of driver heterogeneity is a crucial factor for both loyalty programs and pricing strate- 
gies. Séjourné et al. (2018) quantify how much platform fragmentation degrades the eﬃciency of the system. They study the 
increase in the supply rebalancing cost in a setting where demand is exogenously split between multiple platforms. They 
show, under a large-market scaling, that the additional cost due to fragmentation either vanishes or grows unboundedly 
depending on the nature of the exogenous demand. 
For future research, more empirical analysis of platform competition from diverse perspectives would be highly worth- 
while, because of the diﬃculty of accessing real data from multiple competing platforms. We also expect future work on 
platform competition with collaboration under different market conditions and regulations. 
6.2. Impacts on other transportation services 
It is not surprising that the emergence and popularity of ridesourcing systems has had large direct impacts on existing 
transportation services. A rich strand of literature discusses the impacts and interactions of ridesourcing platforms on public 
transportation services, especially as potential substitutes for and/or complements to public transit. In ongoing debates, the 
literature offers widely differing results that depend on speciﬁc assumptions and contexts. 
Some work illustrates ridesourcing systems complementing public transit. For example, Zhang and Zhang (2018) examine 
the relationship between the frequency and probability of ridesourcing use and the frequency of public transit use in the US 
utilizing individual-level travel frequency data from the 2017 National Household Travel Survey. They show that, in general, 
a one-unit increase in public transit use is signiﬁcantly positively related to a 1.2% increase in the monthly frequency of 
using ridesourcing services and a 5.7% increase in the probability of using ridesourcing services. Additionally, the positive 
relationship between ridesourcing services and public transit use is more pronounced for people who live in areas with 
high population density or in households with fewer vehicles. Differentiating short- and long-distance public transit trips, 
Babar and Burtch (2017) evaluate the effects of ridesourcing service entry on the use of public transit over the subsequent 12 
months by constructing a difference-in-difference model using agency-level data. They ﬁnd that Uber substitutes for road- 
based short-distance public transit trips, which is evidenced by a 1.05% decrease in the use of city buses over the 12 months 
following Uber’s entry. They also ﬁnd that Uber complements rail-based long-distance public transit trips; Uber’s entry is 
related to a 2.59% increase in the use of subways and a 7.24% increase in the use of commuter rails over the subsequent 12 
months. 
Some work studies the substitutions of public transit by ridesourcing systems. For example, in the case of NYC, 
Schaller (2017) ﬁnds that growth in ridesourcing ridership accelerated at the same time as subway and bus ridership began 
to decline. The mileage added to city streets by ridesourcing is more than the total yellow cab mileage in Manhattan in 
2016. Hoffmann et al. (2016) mention that ridesourcing and subway usage are positively correlated on the surface in data 
from NYC; however, expoiting a series of exogenous shocks to the system—the closing of subway stations—they suggest 
that the average shock results in an increase of over 30% in the use of ridesourcing services, indicating the potential for 
crowd-based systems to serve as infrastructure that helps smooth unexpected supply and demand surges. Using survey re- 
sults for San Francisco, Rayle et al. (2016) ﬁnd that while ridesourcing replaces taxi trips, at least half of the ridesourcing 
trips replaced modes other than taxi, including public transit and driving. Using the Transit app and Uber data in NYC and 
assuming users who request Uber through the Transit app are signaling their intent to try transit ﬁrst—but are willing to 
move on to other modes when transit does not meet their needs—Davidson et al. (2017) ﬁnd that Transit app users request 
Uber at a higher rate, both within 250 feet of a public transit station and with greater dispersion across the entire city than 
the general population of Uber ride-hails, which suggests that Transit app users attempt to use Uber to make up for gaps 
in their transit options. Hampshire et al. (2018) use Uber and Lyft service suspension in Austin as a natural experiment to 
measure the impact of the suspension of ridesourcing on travel behavior. The results reveal that of the population surveyed, 
42% of respondents who had used Uber or Lyft prior to the suspension transitioned to another platform after suspension, 
41% transitioned to a personal vehicle, 3% transitioned to public transit, and 9% purchased an additional vehicle in response 
to the service suspension. 
There is a growing body of literature on the comparisons between ridesourcing platforms and conventional taxis. For 
example, using survey data from San Francisco, Rayle et al. (2014) ﬁnd that ridesourcing waiting times are markedly shorter 
and more consistent than those of taxis, while ridesourcing users tend to be younger, own fewer vehicles, and travel more 
frequently with companions. Cramer and Krueger (2016) show, using data from ﬁve cities in the US, that drivers for UberX 
service have captured a higher capacity utilization rate than taxi drivers, which can be explained by four factors: (i) the plat- 
form’s eﬃcient matching technology, (ii) the platform’s larger scale, (iii) ineﬃcient taxi regulations, and (iv) the platform’s 
ﬂexible labor model and surge pricing. 
Ridesourcing platforms have especially large impacts on conventional taxi services, and much of the literature focuses on 
the impacts. For example, Wallsten (2015) explores a dataset from the NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission, taxi consumer 
complaints from NYC and Chicago, and information from Google Trends on the popularity of Uber. The author ﬁnds that 
Uber’s increasing popularity is associated with a decline in consumer complaints per trip about taxis in NYC. In Chicago, 
Uber’s growth is associated with a decline in particular types of complaints about taxis, including broken credit card 
146 H. Wang and H. Yang / Transportation Research Part B 129 (2019) 122–155 
machines, air conditioning and heating, rudeness, and talking on cell phones. The author provides evidence that Uber has 
created an alternative for consumers who would otherwise have complained to the regulator and encouraged taxis to im- 
prove their own service in response to the new competition. Alley (2016) studies the impact of Uber on the taxi industry 
in NYC and argues that the price of taxicab medallions has declined precipitously since the arrival of Uber in the city by a 
factor of approximately 30% in three years. Harding et al. (2016) argue that the ridesourcing platforms solve the credence 
goods and thin market problems for the taxi industry and largely mitigate the problem related to open access, but they also 
bring potential problems such as instability of supply and demand, collusion and monopoly. Nie (2017) studies the impacts 
of ridesourcing platforms on the conventional taxi industry using taxi GPS trajectory data in Shenzhen, China. The author 
ﬁnds that (i) ridesourcing platforms cause signiﬁcant loss in the ridership of taxis; (ii) taxis compete more effectively with 
ridesourcing in peak periods and in areas with high population density; (iii) e-hailing platforms help lift the capacity utiliza- 
tion rate of taxis; and (iv) ridesourcing platforms worsen congestion for taxis in the city, but the impact is relatively mild. 
From an inverse perspective, Murphy (2016) suggests some ways that public transit can learn from, build on, and interface 
with new transportation services, including ridesourcing services, based on in-depth interviews with transportation oﬃcials, 
a survey of shared mobility users, and analysis of transit and ridesourcing capacity and demand. 
In the future, creating positive synergies between ridesourcing services and other transportation and urban services—with 
the aim of making the entire transportation and urban system more eﬃcient—will introduce many promising and important 
research questions. Examples include integrating the design of ridesourcing and ﬁxed-route transit systems (e.g., zone-based 
and line-based ridesourcing e-hailing services along a ﬁxed-route transit line as in Chen and Nie, 2017 ), schedule and route 
optimization of public transit (e.g., buses and metro) while considering ridesourcing’s complementary and feeding effects 
(e.g., last-mile and ﬁrst-mile services as in Wang and Odoni, 2014; Wang, 2017 ), and the integrated design and operation of 
ridesourcing systems with other urban services, such as food delivery and urban freight logistics. 
6.3. Societal and environmental impacts 
Ridesourcing systems also have impacts in a much broader societal context. Some studies discuss these impacts from 
an environmental perspective, such as the effects on car ownership, energy and fuel consumption, air pollutant emissions, 
and traﬃc congestion. In particular, private car ownership in the presence of emerging ridesourcing services has attracted 
strong attention from researchers, but has reached no conclusions. While sharing mobility is assumed to reduce private 
car ownership on the surface, Anderson (2014) raises the concern that ridesourcing can serve as a prop for private car 
ownership because some drivers use their ridesourcing income to support their own use of a private vehicle or even to 
purchase a vehicle. Based on survey results for San Francisco, Rayle et al. (2016) ﬁnd that the presence of ridesourcing 
might not affect car ownership behavior; Clewlow and Mishra (2017) ﬁnd that 91% of ridesourcing users did not make any 
changes to car ownership in survey results for seven major cities in the US. 
Some research ﬁnds evidence of positive environmental impacts of ridesourcing systems using speciﬁc datasets. For ex- 
ample, using data from Didi in the case of Beijing, Yu et al. (2017) argue that ridesourcing systems yield substantial energy 
savings and air pollutant emission reductions from the long-term perspective attributing to the weakening willingness on 
purchasing new cars. Li et al. (2016) investigate Uber’s effects on traﬃc congestion and the environment (e.g., carbon emis- 
sions) in urban areas of the United States using data from Uber and the Urban Mobility Report. Speciﬁcally, they examine 
how the entry of Uber affects traﬃc congestion using a difference-in-difference framework and provide empirical evidence 
that ridesourcing services signiﬁcantly decrease traﬃc congestion. Zheng et al. (2019) analyze ridesplitting data from Didi 
in the case of Hangzhou and argue that ridesplitting can reduce vehicles on road. Alexander and González (2015) propose a 
method to assess the impacts of ridesourcing services on urban traﬃc and congestion using mobile phone data. They extract 
average daily trips from mobile phone records and estimate the proportions of these trips made by auto and non-auto trav- 
elers. They match similar trips spatially and temporally and assume a range of adoption rates for auto and non-auto users 
to distill vehicle trips on ridesourcing platforms. Using data from Boston, they estimate a reduction in vehicles if non-auto 
users’ adoption rate is less than about three times auto users’ adoption rate. 
On the other hand, some research ﬁnds evidence of more neutral and/or negative environmental impacts from ridesourc- 
ing systems. For example, Anderson (2014) argues that due to the relative lack of regulatory oversight of vehicle standards 
and quantity, ridesourcing could prove less ecologically desirable than conventional taxis: In San Francisco, for example, 
nearly 100% of the conventional taxi ﬂeet is composed of recent-model “clean air” vehicles, while only 17% of ridesourc- 
ing vehicles dropping passengers at the airport are clean air vehicles estimated by San Francisco Police Department. They 
also raise the concern that ridesourcing services could increase congestion by drawing more drivers into the city and in- 
crease vehicle-miles-traveled by drivers deadheading long distances to and from work. Using survey data collected in San 
Francisco, Rayle et al. (2016) ﬁnd that 8% of ridesourcing trips were induced travel, which is not an insigniﬁcant amount 
in terms of causing more congestion and emissions. Schaller (2017) argues that a continuation of ridesourcing-led growth 
in travel is not a sustainable way to grow the city. Adding ridesourcing mileage to already congested streets will lead to 
mounting costs for businesses and consumers from increasing traﬃc delays and hinder progress toward goals for mobility, 
economic growth, and environmental improvement. Jin et al. (2018b) argue that the impact of ridesourcing systems on traf- 
ﬁc congestion near city centers is still unclear. Even though ridesourcing has promoted a green image, its true environmental 
impact has not been investigated thoroughly and its impact on energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions are still 
uncertain. 
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An emerging literature studies societal impacts on other areas from diverse perspectives. For example, Rogers (2015) ar- 
gues that a platform’s partial consolidation of the car-hire sector and its compilation of data on passenger and driver behav- 
ior may enable both platform and regulators to ensure safety and root out discrimination against passengers with relative 
ease; while other work such as Ge et al. (2016) point out some discriminatory behavior and unequal treatment of passen- 
gers by drivers. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) ﬁnd that the entry of Uber services into markets in California between 2009 
and 2014 brought a signiﬁcant drop in the rate of vehicle homicides using a difference-in-difference approach to exploit the 
natural experiment. Zhang and Li (2017) use a quasi-experiment to estimate the impact of ridesourcing services on urban 
consumer patterns. They identify an associated increase in the frequency and total amount spent on local food/drink busi- 
nesses from Uber/Lyft entry and its strong relationship with Uber/Lyft usage intensity, but no notable increase in the amount 
spent per food or drink transaction. Burtch et al. (2018) examine how the entry of gig-economy platforms inﬂuences local 
entrepreneurial activity. On the one hand, such platforms may reduce entrepreneurial activity by offering stable employment 
for the unemployed and underemployed; on the other, such platforms may enable entrepreneurial activity by offering work 
ﬂexibility that allows the entrepreneur to redeploy resources strategically in order to pursue the nascent venture. Results 
indicate a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between Uber’s entry and two measures of entrepreneurial activity: crowd- 
funding campaign launches at Kickstarter and levels of self-employment. Results also suggest that gig-economy platforms 
predominantly reduce lower quality entrepreneurial activity, seemingly by offering viable employment for the unemployed 
and underemployed. In the future, we expect more empirical research that explores the impacts of ridesourcing systems 
from diverse perspectives, such as safety, privacy, employment, and the social ties of users. 
6.4. Regulations 
Conventional legacy taxis in most cities are heavily regulated. These regulations often govern who can operate a taxicab, 
in which areas they can operate (e.g., King and Saldarriaga, 2018 , estimate that up to 50 0,0 0 0 km per week of deadhead 
travel are associated with restrictions on pick-up locations for taxis in NYC), and how much they can charge for their ser- 
vices. In contrast, most drivers working on ridesourcing platforms do not need a certiﬁcate or license for commercial ride 
services; i.e., they operate personally owned or leased vehicles for a commercial purpose in legal gray areas. They can choose 
when and where to work, and the fare charged can be adjusted dynamically. In addition, ridesourcing services are not yet 
subject to taxes in some countries, which essentially confers advantages on ridesourcing platforms over legacy taxi service 
providers, who claim that these platforms open the door to unfair competition. In addition, the unclear regulation also raises 
concerns about user privacy, public safety, and the limited liability of ridesourcing platforms. One can refer to Malhotra and 
Van Alstyne (2014) for a discussion of so-called “dark side” of the sharing economy. 
In practice, regulators behave differently across countries. Shaheen et al. (2016) and Cohen and Shaheen (2018) provide 
detailed reports for current practices of shared mobility in the US. Other reports and cases include Wahyuningtyas (2016) on 
Indonesia, Dudley et al. (2017) on London, Defossez (2017) on Brazil and the European Union, de Souza Silva et al. (2018) on 
Brazil, Li et al. (2018) on Singapore, and Puche (2019) on Mexico City and Bogota. In fact, regulating ridesourcing platforms 
triggers a dilemma, as Ranchordás (2015) points out: On the one hand, innovation in the sharing economy should not be 
stiﬂed by excessive and outdated regulation; on the other hand, there is a real need to protect the users of these services 
from fraud, liability, and unskilled service providers. The author suggests that innovation in the sharing economy requires 
fewer, but broader, rules that do not stiﬂe innovation, but also impose a minimum of legal requirements that take into 
account the speciﬁcities of innovative sharing economy practices. Rogers (2015) argues that Uber’s success stems not just 
from regulatory arbitrage or other malfeasance, but from having created a far more eﬃcient market for car-hire services. 
Yu et al. (2019a) evaluate the regulation of ridesourcing platforms in China using a two-period dynamic game that incor- 
porates various competing goals and argue that without government intervention, the ridesourcing platform can drive con- 
ventional taxis industry out of the market under some conditions. They also ﬁnd that a carefully designed regulatory policy 
can strike a better balance of multiple competing objectives. Aarhaug and Olsen (2018) point out that as market segments 
differ and shift in relative importance, possible and suitable forms of regulation for ridesourcing markets should change in 
comparison with conventional markets. A report from the International Transport Forum (see ITF, 2016 ) argues that regula- 
tion should focus on the needs of passengers and society, be kept as simple and uniform as possible, encourage innovative 
and more ﬂexible regulation, and embrace data-led regulation. Rauch and Schleicher (2015) offer three predictions of the 
approaches governments will take toward the sharing economy in the medium-term future: Cities will (i) subsidize sharing 
ﬁrms to motivate them to enter or expand certain services; (ii) harness sharing ﬁrms for economic redistribution; and (iii) 
hire sharing ﬁrms as contractors to provide city services. 
A growing literature on law and public policy discusses the regulation of business in a sharing economy. For example, 
Edelman and Geradin (2015) suggest a need to adapt laws and regulations to allow ridesourcing platforms to operate legally, 
that platforms should comply with regulatory requirements that are necessary to correct genuine market failures, and that 
these requirements should remain in force. Katz (2015) argues that instead of forcing platforms to conform to the same 
rules as conventional taxi services, the government may loosen restrictions for conventional taxi services while increasing 
protection for passengers and drivers on ridesourcing platforms. Posen (2015) argues that the solution is not to force plat- 
forms to comply with outdated regulations; rather, regulators should rely on experimental regulations for safety, which will 
allow passengers to make their own choices regarding which service they would prefer to use while ensuring their safety. 
Harding et al. (2016) argue that instead of restricting the growth of the platforms, regulators should focus on reducing the 
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likelihood of monopoly and collusion. In terms of the interests of the platform, Cannon and Summers (2014) list ways that 
platforms can increase their business better under regulations, such as sharing data and presenting a well-researched case 
for the value of the platform. Other discussions can be found in Koopman et al. (2014), Witt et al. (2015) and others. 
A critical controversy for ridesourcing platforms is the driver’s legal role—i.e., whether drivers are independent contrac- 
tors, freelancers or platform employees. Conﬂicts arise when drivers allege that they are denied employment beneﬁts, while 
platforms counter that they do not employ drivers but merely license access to a platform that matches those who need 
rides with available drivers. Means and Seiner (2015) argue that the classiﬁcation of drivers as independent contractors 
or employees should be determined by an overarching inquiry: How much ﬂexibility do individuals have in determining 
the time, place, price, manner, and frequency of the work they perform on the platform? Hagiu and Wright (2019) show 
that being too strict or too liberal in classifying drivers as independent contractors (relative to the actual degree of control 
drivers have) can be detrimental, not just to ﬁrms and welfare, but sometimes to the drivers themselves. They also explore 
the extent to which an intermediate classiﬁcation of drivers between employees and independent contractors may lead to 
better outcomes. Other discussion of the employment relationship and classiﬁcation can be found in Acevedo (2016) and 
Redfearn (2016) . 
The unclear legal role of drivers also gives rise to a critical problem regarding tax rules and enforcement in ridesourcing 
systems, which has attracted the attention of researchers in auditing and law. For example, Oei and Ring (2015) point out 
that tax enforcement and compliance regarding ridesourcing may present challenges arising from two features: First, the 
business opportunistically picks the more favourable regulatory interpretation if there is ambiguity regarding which rule 
applies or whether a rule applies. Second, the “microbusiness” nature of sharing raises unique compliance and enforcement 
concerns. Bruckner (2016) also points out that taxpayers working on on-demand platforms face potential exposure to audit 
and penalties for failure to comply with ﬁling rules that are triggered by relatively low levels of earned income and inconsis- 
tent adoption of reporting rules. Oei and Ring (2016) investigate the tax issues and challenges faced by ridesourcing drivers 
by analyzing their interactions in internet discussion forums. They ﬁnd that while forum participants generally displayed ac- 
curate understanding of tax ﬁling and income inclusion obligations, their approaches to expenses and deductions were less 
accurate and more varied in sophistication and willingness to comply with tax law. Zoepf et al. (2018) study the fact that 
the drivers of Uber and Lyft are able to use a standard mileage deduction to account for vehicle expenses for tax purposes. 
The deduction was $0.54/mile in 2016 in the US, which is substantially larger than the calculated costs of $0.30/mile for the 
driver population in a survey of over 1100 drivers for Uber and Lyft. The authors ﬁnd that 73.5% of an estimated U.S. market 
of $4.8B in annual ridesourcing driver proﬁt is untaxed if drivers are able to capitalize on their losses fully for tax purposes. 
Another critical question is the safety of ridesourcing services. Feeney (2015) argues that the cash-free transactions and 
self-identiﬁed passengers on ridesourcing platforms substantially mitigates one of the worst risks associated with conven- 
tional taxis: violent crime. On another note, using U.S. county-level data from 2007 through 2015, Dills and Mulholland 
(2018) ﬁnd a lower rate of DUI (i.e., driving under the inﬂuence) and fatal accidents and a decline in arrests for assault and 
disorderly conduct after Uber’s entry; conversely, they observe an increase in vehicle thefts. In China, the Supreme Court 
published a comparison of crime cases between ridesourcing platforms and conventional taxi services (see Supreme Court of 
China, 2018 , source in Chinese). The data in China show that the crime rate for ridesourcing platform drivers is much lower 
than for conventional taxi drivers. Speciﬁcally, the crime rate for ridesourcing platform drivers is 0.048 per 10,0 0 0 in 2017 
in China, while the crime rate for conventional taxi drivers is 0.627 per 10,0 0 0. However, several serious criminal incidents 
in the peer-to-peer ridesharing services in various countries has raised huge concern from the general public regarding the 
safety of ridesourcing services. 
With technological development and business innovation, ridesourcing systems will certainly continue to evolve. Regu- 
lating the ridesourcing industry in diverse cultures and environments, while considering the welfare of all stakeholders—
i.e., passengers, independent freelance drivers, taxi drivers, ridesourcing platforms, legacy taxi companies, and the general 
public—will offer avenues for long-term research. 
7. Summary 
With the rapid development and popularization of mobile and wireless communication technologies, ridesourcing com- 
panies have been able to leverage internet-based platforms to operate e-hailing services in many cities around the world. 
These companies connect demand (i.e., passengers with travel requests) and supply (i.e., drivers providing transportation ser- 
vices) and are disruptively changing the transportation industry, and especially the conventional taxi industry. These shared 
transportation companies are often viewed as pioneers in a general sharing economy. 
The ridesourcing platforms consist of a typical two-sided market, which is a meeting place for passengers and drivers 
who interact and provide each other with network beneﬁts. Passengers and drivers are sensitive to the prices and wages of 
the service, which are critical decisions the platform makes to coordinate and balance demand and supply. On the demand 
side, passengers with temporal and spatial characteristics consider fare and service quality with alternative travel modes in 
making their travel decisions. On the supply side, drivers, as freelancers, make working decisions ﬂexibly regarding whether 
to work on the platform—and if so, when and how long to work—in response to many variables and factors, including their 
income level from the platform by comparison with other job options. The objectives of ridesourcing systems exist in multi- 
ple dimensions and may change according to the speciﬁc developmental stage, market conditions, platform competition, and 
government regulations. Some common objectives include balancing demand and supply over time and space, maximizing 
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platform revenue and proﬁt, maximizing market share and penetration, and social welfare. To operate the transportation 
service and achieve these objectives, platforms must employ various operational strategies and make decisions from diverse 
perspectives. Designing and operating ridesourcing systems is vital—and challenging—for all stakeholders: passengers/users, 
drivers/service providers, platforms, policy makers, and the general public. 
In this paper, we propose a general framework to describe ridesourcing systems, which illustrates the intrinsic relations 
between variables and factors for the relevant stakeholders, agents and attributes. In general, trip service quality, driver 
income level, passenger demand, and driver supply are strongly endogenous and interactively dependent, while the en- 
dogenous inﬂuences and interactions are highly dynamic. These variables are thus crucial factors inﬂuencing operational 
strategies and decisions and the resulting eﬃciency of the ridesourcing market. The framework can aid understanding of 
the interactions between endogenous and exogenous variables, their changes in response to platforms’ operational strate- 
gies and decisions, multiple system objectives, and market equilibria in a dynamic manner. 
We summarize important research problems concerning ridesourcing systems and the corresponding methodologies that 
have been and are being developed and implemented to address these problems. These methodologies, both classic and 
novel, include statistics and econometrics, labor economics, microeconomics, queuing theory and stochastic process, integer 
and combinatorial optimization, stochastic and dynamic programming, game theory and mechanism design, and machine 
learning techniques. We conduct a comprehensive review of the literature in different areas from diverse perspectives, in- 
cluding demand and pricing, supply and incentives, platform operations, and competition, impacts and regulations. 
On the demand side, important research problems include (1) spatio-temporal demand estimation for ridesourcing sys- 
tems, (2) passenger mode choice with other travel alternatives, (3) mechanisms and algorithms for static and dynamic pric- 
ing, and (4) other passenger promotions. On the supply side, important research problems include (1) driver supply models 
to describe short- and long-term platform service capacity, (2) driver supply elasticity with respect to wage and incentives, 
(3) other driver behavior, and (4) mechanisms and algorithms for static and dynamic wages and incentives. To operate plat- 
form services better and improve system performance and eﬃciency, research problems for operators include (1) estimated 
time of arrival (ETA) for both pick-up and ride trips; eﬃcient operational strategies and algorithms for (2) order dispatching 
and matching between passengers and drivers, (3) ridesplitting operations related to assignment and fare splitting, and (4) 
guidance and repositioning of empty vehicles awaiting new passengers; and (5) information sharing and disclosure and (6) 
rating mechanism. Considering ridesourcing services as a part of a larger urban transportation system, research problems 
arise from (1) platform competition, (2) impacts on other transportation services, (3) societal and environmental impacts, 
and (4) relevant governmental regulations and policies. 
The proposed framework and the review suggest many avenues requiring future research, such as the improvement of 
various components and their integration to form a more eﬃcient ridesourcing system, and the system’s integration with 
other urban and mobility services under a general sharing economy and smart city context. Ridesourcing systems are boom- 
ing and still evolving. We expect more exciting research will emerge to improve and reshape both shared transportation, 
and the entire transportation and urban system to the beneﬁt of all. 
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